THE EUROPEAN

THE JOURNAL OF OPPOSITION

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POLITICS BOOKS TRAVEL

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ANALYSIS

IN a troubled situation two things chiefly matter: the first is that conference with the Russians should occur and continue; the second is that Europe should act together. Where and how this conference should take place, did not so much matter to anyone who preferred reality to forms. Who takes the lead in the action of a United Europe also does not so much matter to anyone who has learnt to think and feel as a European. What matters is to secure peace and the unity of Europe; from these two achievements all else could follow.

We would, ourselves. have preferred in the first instance, the ad hoc summit conference of more workmanlike character, which was originally proposed by Mr. Khrushchev and was regarded as more desirable by the French; it was, also, apparently acceptable to the English except for the reluctance of the Americans. But Mr. Macmillan was surely right to support the transfer of the occasion to the United Nations rather than to risk a breakdown. On the other hand, General de Gaulle was surely right to seek the inclusion of the other European powers and thus to secure some unity in European action; the attempt was a considerable service to this continent.

The reasons for virtually continuous conference.

The outcome of any conference cannot be known before these lines go to press, but it is possible to urge certain considerations which will remain valid whatever occurs. The idea is surely wrong that disagreement at a conference is an irretrievable disaster, and that, consequently, everything must be so thoroughly prepared in advance by diplomats that it is virtually settled in advance by these officials. This seems to us an altogether false view of the future in which, whether we like it or not, we have to live continuously with the Russians in the small room which the world has become, if the world itself is to continue. We cannot quarrel too violently without destroying everything, including ourselves, but considerable disagreements, and, in particular, a protracted and finally decisive battle of ideas are inevitable.

The chief danger of universal destruction is accident, or one of those incredible follies which usually arise in human affairs from fear of what the other side will do. To eliminate this mortal danger, virtually constant conference is necessary, at least until we have reduced the risk of accident and panic, and, probably, until we have evolved some ordered principle and method of live and let live.

To this end continual meetings with the Russians, and also undoubtedly on many occasions very sharp debates, are clearly necessary. We shall never get anywhere if our leaders are either inhibited from meeting by a meticulous pomposity or by fear of being made to look foolish in debates to which they feel inadequate. The recent English initiative indicates a certain improvement in this respect, even if the necessitv for virtually continuous conference is not yet entirely grasped.

Jordan and Kuweit.

Before returning to the long term and compelling reasons for such form of conference with the Russians, it is unfortunately necessary to note again a relatively short term situation in which the performance of British Government has been a good deal less satisfactory. Their virtue in desiring a conference to clear up the mess by no means entirely excuses them from the fault of having made the mess; particularly in the eyes of fellow countrymen who have to pay for the result in direct economic consequence.

The entry into Jordan appears more and more clearly to have been an act of conspicuous folly. We remarked it in our last issue, directly the landing in Jordan occurred: "If Britain now landed at Kuweit, this would at least have a practical object; a very large part of the oil supplies would be saved by this application of force and could be permanently defended in that position by sea power." It becomes now more than ever clear that this is what we should have done. When Iraq blew up, our Government should have hurried to embrace and to assist their friend the Sheik of Kuweit, in whose territory are 40% of our present oil supplies, and not have lifted a finger in Jordan beyond possibly throwing a little good money after much bad money, in order to ease the retirement of regimes they should never have supported. Kuweit means a lot, and Jordan nothing.

Establishment and Arabs; "like goes to like."

But as usual nothing was thought out and prepared in advance;

our ministers reacted again with the first crude reflex of a petulant hysteria. And it will not be too easy to make a dignified exit from this Victorian (or is it Edwardian?) fit of the vapours. As for Kuweit, the action which was at first simple is now excluded except in dire necessity by the risk of a world explosion. You can get away with making one move like that, but not two. So the reality in Kuweit may yet be sacrificed to the shadow in Jordan; Tory all too Tory. In short, our rulers backed the wrong horses throughout. They always selected men who were the exact Arab equivalent of themselves. These men always disappear directly things get serious, just as our rulers will disappear at the parallel point; naturally their final disappearance will be in peaceful, civilised Western form, after due debate and by vote of the people at a general election. But the basic similarity remains; like goes to like, and, in analogous circumstances, like will go with like. The present errors of Western government are not so superficial as may at first appear; they are deep-rooted in character. "The world is character."

We need not at this time reiterate the real policy — so wantonly discarded in a series of follies — the policy of genuine friendship with the Arabs and consequent backing of the real men in the twentieth century Arab Movement. We have with them a common interest which should lead to a brotherhood of common action before the communist menace which in the end threatens European and Musselman alike. We must return in the end to that policy, but it will need new hands as well as fresh thought.

The limitations of nuclear weapons.

One useful lesson can emerge from the awkward situation of regular troops in these popular risings in the Middle East. It is quite clear in these conditions that the major nuclear weapons cannot be used; not even in "bush fire wars" as they have come to be called. Yet British strategy under Mr. Sandys is based entirely on employment of the major nuclear weapons, with the result that the army is to be reduced from 400,000 to 150,000 men. The enquiry of Mr. Head in the recent debate was apt: How could Mr. Sandys deal with such situations if his reforms had been completed, and we only had an army of 150,000 men?

But this matter has a far deeper significance if we consider it not only in relation to remote Middle Eastern states — which we should enter, in any case, not with troops but with a policy of friendship — but to highly organized communist risings during a

period of economic recession in the main countries of the west. Where should we then be if we had nothing but the great deterrent of nuclear rockets to deal with the highly trained political-military guerrillas of communism? Nuclear rockets cannot be used in the streets of western European cities during a communist rising, possibly reinforced by Soviet paratroops or, at least, by a highly planned infiltration of specialists.

***The European Situation*, published in 1950.**

Reference was made to these possibilities, which modern experience makes more imminent, in an essay called "The European Situation," published in March 1950. The premise of the argument was that when both sides possessed the modern weapons, neither side would dare to use them for fear of world destruction: "It has often been said that wars would end because they would become too dangerous. That prophecy has never yet proved true. It would be a delusion of optimism to believe that it is now true. But it is possible, and even probable, that wars in the old style will now end for this reason. What state will declare war, or attack and destroy another state, if it is certain, also, to be destroyed? A fight in which both participants are certain to be killed is unlikely to take place."

The argument continued: "The Soviets cannot impose communism on the rest of the world with this weapon (the H-bomb), even if they can obtain it. They can only make the rest of the world a desert with the certainty that Russia, too, will become a desert. That is why war between states in the old style may come to an end. Neither of the great powers will dare to move because that would mean death to both. We are reaching the period of the paralysed giants." This thinking has now become so familiar that even Lord Hailsham has caught up with it, and enunciated it most solemnly in a recent discourse.

New forms of struggle.

But the conclusion published in the same essay is only now beginning to enter military calculation as a result of recent experience; we need to accelerate this process of thought. The conclusion was: "It is probable that we are entering a period of almost completely new forms of struggle for which the past has only slight and partial lessons. In deep character recurring struggle will be a battle of ideas. It is clearly possible only for those who have an idea to take effective part in such a contest. The Soviets

will launch not a war of states but a war of politics reinforced by violence. They will support their losing idea with concealed force. At some point in the future the Soviets are, therefore, certain to carry the battle of ideas beyond the ordinary political struggle into the sphere of political violence."

"The world has so far had only a slight experience of the new technique. We are familiar with the wrecking tactics of communism, through which the Soviets seek to destroy from within the system of their opponents. The methods of the strike and the mobilization of mobs for the cruder forms of political violence are well known; also, the use of their agents in all lands both for the theft of secrets and the sabotage of vital industries. They have tried in this way to break down the system of their enemies and to integrate their own; to turn all other countries into a mob and Russia into an army; to impose order at home but to export chaos; to dissolve others, but to unify themselves, under an oriental despotism. Their previous tactics will be intensified, but quite new methods will be added to them. At a certain point the Soviets will make a decisive advance into active political war. It will be a war of infiltration conducted by the political guerrillas who are now being trained, either under the guise of police forces or entirely in secret, within those zones of Eastern Europe which are under Soviet control. The struggle will then traverse the political-military border line.

"At this stage new tactics will be introduced to warfare, and, later, new types of weapons..."

These things can occur nearer home.

The essay continued: "conditions will be similar to the guerrilla war launched and encouraged by the allies in the later stages of the last war. But that method will be greatly intensified and developed, because it will be the whole war. The tactic will be to hit without being hit. It will be a fight between invisible foes who cannot strike without being located and, therefore, cannot be struck. The aim will be the nerve centres of the opposing government. The object will be not to destroy, but to win the support of the civilian population. The mass of the people will probably be less affected than by the ordinary wars of the past. But their political support will be ardently sought during a struggle of ideas in which the enthusiasm of the people will be finally decisive." So ran the argument, published in *The European Situation* in

1950.

Is it not now clear from the limited examples which have already occurred in remote countries that something of the kind can occur far nearer home, if the West fails to master its economic troubles, and is it not also clear that in our present military organization we have no plans whatever to meet this situation? Is it not also clear that this is a far more likely tactic for the Soviets to adopt than to release a world war which can destroy the world including themselves; particularly in conditions of an economic recession in the West which a relaxation of military and armament tension, accompanied by intensive Soviet dumping on western markets, can do so much to promote?

But Lord Hailsham and the vital vanguard of conservative thought appear only to have caught up with the premises of eight years ago. And these have only led them so far to a certain complacency in believing that major wars cannot now take place. They are still remote from the uncomfortable conclusion that the Soviets may now strive to impose their idea by new and more effective means of struggle. Yet Lord Hailsham is at least to be congratulated on realising the importance of the battle of ideas :— "the battle-field is in the hearts and minds of men" — and may even be so much inspired by this discovery as to go out and look for a conservative idea.

Ready for everything except what will happen?

Meanwhile his colleague Mr. Sandys apparently sandbags his chiefs of staff in the name of modernity, just as their ideas come very much up to date. We simply must have the manpower to deal with the whole situation; preferably manpower obtained by far more attractive conditions of regular service. (Mr. Sandys' success in recruiting is, of course, largely due to the sense of impending industrial depression, which, unfortunately, is likely to increase). The whole situation comprises the possibility of nuclear war, which only remains a considerable possibility if we cease to be prepared for it; the "bush fire" wars in remote places where some of our vital resources are temporarily and erroneously placed; and, finally, the possibility of having to meet a highly organized civil war of communist initiative within vital centres of the west, in the event of a really serious economic situation.

The modernism of Mr. Sandys looks like being true to the old tradition of readiness for every war except the one we have to

fight. And Mr. Sandys may not be the man to change his mind in the face of fresh evidence; that requires real strength of character — not just an exhibition of weak playing strong — something more than the qualities which started two new movements before the war in challenge to the Establishment, only "to end up with himself and the Duchess of Atholl." All the admirable qualities of the distinguished Duchess would scarcely be adequate to the coming situation.

Is a thought dead, when Conservatism catches up?

But is the great premise of mutual deterrent, now universally and belatedly accepted, still valid? There is always an uneasy feeling when a prophet of conservatism catches up with a new idea, that it must already be out of date. When Lord Hailsham arrives, is not the thought already dead? There are certainly some disturbing symptoms that this is so; they are not conclusive, but sufficient to put us on guard against all complacency. Take first a look at the recent book published by Mr. Raymond Earl Garthoff (Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age) who is apparently an American Defence Dept. expert on Soviet military writings. He deals in some detail with a school of Soviet military thinking which calculates that it would win a nuclear war without very much more loss than Russia suffered in the last war; in particular it is apparently reckoned that the larger immediately available man-power, and especially the larger supply of troops trained for all forms of war would enable them to win in a ruthless trading of losses. Compare this with the analysis contained in the third of four articles recently published in *The Times* describing less extreme but similar trends in American military thinking: "if by some chance it (the deterrent) does not work North America will still be sufficiently protected to survive and win a total war." This macabre complacency may be a little disturbed by some of the facts published by Mr. Joseph Alsop in the *New York Herald Tribune* of August 1st, which suggested that in the "gap" period between 1960 and 1963 inclusive, America might get rather the worst of the trade in death.

Europe's duty, if America withdraws.

When these shocks to the common room jollity of Lord Hailsham's military thinking have been thoroughly absorbed, he should turn to the even more disturbing statement to European

opinion appearing in the *Times* article just quoted in a different context: "no president would order the use of the deterrent against anything but direct attack on the homeland." Europe has certainly been warned, not once but again and again, and in many different ways. The lesson is to unite with the utmost speed and to exert the full latent strength of European science and industry for our own purposes and our own protection; to be ready for all contingencies. It is not too late; we have already great resources of our own, even in very dangerous weapons, and the utmost help America can give would at least be assured in this respect. If, on the other hand, we remain divided and helpless, it is always possible that America may in the end think she may survive when we are destroyed, or may not risk her own life at all to save Europe. In any case, when even considerable sections of America and Russia are thinking in such terms, is it not more than ever necessary that from the long experience, deep wisdom and final capacity for sane resolution — which still lives in Europe — should emerge the third force which can restore balance to the world?

The decisive difficulties of mutual inspection.

This analysis of certain thinking on each side suggests that it is at least possible major nuclear wars may start, if madmen were in charge on either side; madmen, because it is an insane calculation of fanatics that it might be worth while to impose their will on others at such a risk to the world and at such a certain cost to themselves. It is not quite certain that such things cannot occur; we must never, therefore, relax our guard, and it becomes, unfortunately more and more clear that the only guard is the ability to strike back.

We have often expressed doubt whether any system of mutual inspection can be devised to enable the detection of nuclear weapons already in existence. This difficulty is very much confirmed by a study of the question conducted by various experts under the auspices of Columbia University, and recently published. They appear to conclude that there are difficulties in the discovery of existing modern weapons which are almost impossible. We add ourselves a question which can be decisive: is it a fact that science at present has no means even of detecting a load of H or A bombs on a ship entering a harbour, until someone goes on board and has a look? The negative answer we believe to be true, rules out

any immediate hope of disarmament in nuclear weapons. Why then will politicians not speak the truth and put before the public the plain facts? Nothing is more dangerous than to excite easy hopes which are later dashed; nothing so weakens the will to resist and to endure.

Extend Geneva conference of scientists.

These considerations provide additional and compelling reasons for virtually continuous conference with the Russians, with the purpose of at least reducing the dangers of a very dangerous world. Conferences at which men who are at least sane meet together, can at least reduce the danger of insane men getting control on either side in moments of panic.

It is true that we are very unlikely in the near future to obtain disarmament in the main nuclear weapons; neither side can possibly trust the other sufficiently to destroy its own supply without any certainty that the other side will do the same. But a large reduction in land armies and semi-conventional weapons is certainly feasible and could immensely reduce world tension.

The present degree of tension must present the danger of world explosion to the minds of all sane men; the greatest incentive consequently exists on both sides to reduce a danger which could involve world destruction. The risks of accident are considerable in present conditions; wars occurring through one side believing it was attacked, when, in fact, it is not. Such risks would almost certainly be reduced by meetings of scientists on the lines of the conference recently held at Geneva to determine means of detecting nuclear explosion. Some of the same methods could surely be applied in a conference to determine methods by which legitimate and illegitimate flights of bombers or missiles could be determined, and consequently danger of panic and accident reduced.*

Risk of death better than its certainty.

In summary, we shall have to live in a dangerous world for many years to come, unless we prefer the certainty of death to the risk of death, by submitting to communism; the choice which only the extreme of degeneracy would accept. But we can immensely reduce the chances of world disaster by virtually

* Since above was written, we are very glad to note the American Government has now made this proposal.

continual conferences with the Russians, which have the object of reducing the risk of accident and, consequently, of reducing tension. At least, on present form, we have some assurance that sane men are in charge on both sides; even that may not last.

Mr. Harrod and the Treasury; both right, and both wrong.

It has not been necessary lately to reiterate that analysis of the economic situation which has appeared in this journal since its inception, and for years before that. The reason is plain; events begin to speak for themselves. There will, of course, be many contrary short term movements, but the long term trend is now becoming clear.

The increasing difficulties will prove insuperable within the limits of our island and commonwealth system. It is well always to turn for evidence to the best sources, particularly when they are in no way disposed to help us but rather to suggest a solution altogether opposed to our ideas.

Britain's leading economist, Mr. Roy Harrod, published again on July 28th a most significant article in the *Financial Times*, which contained the following passage: "A world recession is on; so far it has not become severe; but there are no factors yet visible likely to make for a major revival, and past experience suggests a further deepening which would be a disaster for the free world. The Americans are likely to do their utmost to pull themselves up. But what, with the best will in the world, they can do is not likely to suffice to pull the world up." So Mr. Harrod does not appear entirely to believe in the present American effort to talk themselves up by their shoe strings, or in the Establishment view that a faithful sycophancy of America will in the end always secure from the *Deus ex Machina* sufficient help to ensure the comfortable survival of those who will not help themselves.

Sterling balances and unrequited exports.

So Mr. Harrod duly proposes a little self help, which he has suggested before; again with a certain diffidence because it directly conflicts with the "Treasury View". He writes: "At the centre of the whole great design should be the fact that in the years now to come Britain will have spare industrial capacity for producing a sizeable quantity of capital goods for additional investment projects in the rest of the Commonwealth." He adds: "...finance, tailored to the cost of these goods, would be supplied

by some mechanism in London — including in the case of the Colonies, drafts upon their sterling balances."

As the "sterling balances" are the "colonies' own property" (i.e. debts we owe them) exports which were paid for by running down the sterling balances would be unrequited exports. We should be obliged for this purpose to sell additional exports in open competition on world markets in order to obtain the raw materials necessary to manufacture these unrequited exports. As Mr. Harrod very fairly admits: "The work proceeding under the investments projects would.....cause imports from outside the Commonwealth to be higher than they would otherwise be." He adds: "It may be objected that the production of capital goods in Britain will require British imports of materials." It may well be objected that in a period of world recession — when in Britain we may have to fight hard on world markets to sell sufficient exports to pay for the foodstuffs and raw materials vital to the life of our own people — the entire effort necessary to buy abroad raw materials for the manufacture of unrequited exports to equip Ghana with all modern amenities, may well be the last straw which breaks the back of a very long suffering camel.

The fear of upsetting the sinking boat.

The "Treasury View", which Mr. Harrod gently assails, has never had any exaggerated regard for the suffering of the camel, but it is acutely conscious of what Mr. Harrod describes as a "very narrow nett reserve," whose deficiency would cause an immediate exchange crash if we tried to buy abroad more than we could sell abroad. So Mr. Harrod is up against it with the Treasury; and for very good reason in the limitations of our present circumstances.

Mr. Harrod says the same dilemma applies to "any policy for full employment here;" and he is clearly right. But the Treasury is, also, right in believing that full employment cannot be maintained in conditions of world recession without risking an exchange crash in an island which is abnormally dependent on external supplies of food and raw materials. The fact is that both Mr. Harrod and the Treasury plainly fear a grave economic situation, but propose conflicting measures to meet it. Lord Hailsham is left alone in the opposite view that "the economic outlook is more hopeful than for several years" *(Financial Times* 30. 7. 58); the coming period will prove him either to be the

prophet the Tory Y.M.C.A. believe him to be, or the most fatuous ass who has yet emerged, even on the contemporary political scene. The two schools of serious authority, represented by Mr. Harrod and the Treasury, both believe in an approaching situation of considerable gravity; e.g. also, the latest Treasury Bulletin which was so grotesquely misrepresented in the Tory popular Press. Mr. Harrod says in effect: action is necessary. The Treasury replies in effect: action is too dangerous. Both are right, and both are wrong; in the sense that the boat will sink if we do nothing, but any movement will upset it. The lesson becomes ever clearer that our economic problem is insoluble within the limits of our Island-Commonwealth economy. Yet neither Mr. Harrod nor the Treasury will so far even look at the finally unavoidable conclusion: make the effort to get into Europe, and find your answer in the self-contained system of Europe-Africa. We, on the other hand, have looked, and seen, for long enough. The time for intensive action is near.

EUROPEAN

EUROPE AND EMPIRE

by J. P. BURY

DURING the new French revolution which we have just witnessed, we have seen great crowds of citizens, in a paroxysm of popular feeling, hurl the old gang out of office in Algeria, and heard them sing the Marseillaise with old-time fervour; messages were transmitted to Paris proclaiming the people's unshakable will to keep Algeria in the orbit of French civilization, and the talking-shop that had brought France so near to ruin has been suspended. At the time of writing it is impossible to say what will be the outcome of all this. But one thing is certain: in an apathetic, vacuous, television-watching age, with *fainéant* politicians and vote-grubbing parties, France has shown the world that there are still Europeans imbued with faith in patriotism, and national mission.

★ ★ ★

One of the salient features of the age which emerged after 1945 has been the withering-away of the European empires and the consequent reduction in importance of the homelands, accompanied by the rise of newer forces in the world which between them have taken over the domination of the planet. Since 1945, Europeans have renounced control in India, Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, Sudan, Ghana. Sometimes Europeans have been ejected, more or less with insults, accusations and even appropriations of property, by the indigenous populations; there has been ill-disguised glee from the Americans and Russians. May 13 seemed the turn of a tide. At last there in Algeria we had the spectacle of a community of Europeans swearing to the death they would dig in their heels and not give in: and what could be even move fruitful, there might thus be caused elsewhere what it is fashionable to call an "agonising reappraisal" of the question — is it wrong for European powers to possess themselves of other lands and diffuse their

way of life there? Are the concepts of imperialism and empire ready for the historical scrap-heap as the left-wing would have us believe?

To the left-wing, of course, imperialism is a bad word. For the left, imperialism is an extension of capitalist rapacity: the idea that settlers should occupy colonies is a form of brigandage; and the idea that Europe has the right to diffuse its civilisation to other peoples, a piece of arrogant hypocrisy. This article proposes to ask whether there is another side to the question.

★ ★ ★

Let us take the case in point, that of Algeria, and see whether facts square with that kind of allegation. Now it is true that to argue this lays one open to the dangers of all arguments from the particular to the general, that of expanding particular conclusions into general rules: but at least this method has the advantage over that of leftist doctrinaires who, proclaiming general principles in accordance with their total theory, go searching in highly selective fashion for every abuse which supports their argument while ignoring any good emanating from the object of their censure.

French occupation of Algeria began in 1830. At that time, the peoples of Algeria (as also those of Tunisia and Morocco) were in the last stages of chaos. One hesitates to refer to them as "the Algerian people" or the "Tunisian nation" because such designation gives the impression of organised communities possessed of national identity and consciousness: before the French arrived, imposing organisation and names, the region was inhabited by tribes who incessantly warred among themselves and who were not even a recognisable racial entity at all (some 30% Berber, the majority Arabs, with Turkish, Jewish and other elements). The country was prefeudal; the Dey of Algiers exercised a sway only over the city of Algiers itself. Slavery was part of the order of things. The women wore the veil and lived in seclusion, and education was confined to the memorising of the barely-comprehensible seventh-century Arabic verses of the Koran. The tribes living along the coast were of course notorious for their piratic activity.

"It was an almost purely piratical state, maintaining itself by the capture and sale of Christian slaves as well as of merchandise: when at the end of the 18th Century piratical attacks in the Mediterranean were greatly reduced by the navies of the European

powers; this further impoverished a country where neither agriculture nor commerce flourished and order was quite inadequately maintained" — this quotation is not a Gaullist hand out, but comes from the objective pages of Chambers Encyclopedia. It was this piracy which led to the French occupation in 1830. (The U.S. incidentally, which has waxed indignant about French North African imperialist activities, lent aid in the campaign by sending her fleet to bombard Tripoli).

Soon after occupation of the wretched land, colonists started to come in. By 1881, they numbered 375,000, by 1900, half a million. Many of the present day *colons* come of families which have been in Algeria for five generations.

During these 130 years of the "French presence" new cities rose at Algiers; Oran, Philippeville, Bone, Constantine. Wheat-farms, vineyards, the cotton-plantations of the Chelif Valley sprang up to give a new aspect to the land. Broad paved roads and 3000 miles of railways were built to link all the major centres, facilitating movement for cars and donkeys alike.

New hospitals dispensed healing to French and Moslems. 300,000 Algerians were able to migrate to France and find livelihoods in all capacities from carpet-sellers to doctors-at-law. Thanks to European medical science, the Moslem population swelled from two million in 1830 to eight million today. And the European population grew apace, till now there are 1,200,000 of them; not necessarily all rich capitalists, but the majority ordinary folk from France, also many from Spain, Italy and Corsica, who set up small farms, shops and businesses.

In sharp contrast with the teeming *kasbahs* produced by the indigenous population, bright white cities with broad streets and good sewage rose in a land which had never known them since the Romans occupied the region under the name of Numidia. In a country which had reached the condition of Europe in the Dark Ages, and which, under Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Almohades, Turks, had never accommodated more than a collection of amorphous tribes, France set down an extension of her own incomparable civilisation.

Inevitably, the tides of anti-colonialism sweeping round the world in the second quarter of the twentieth century reached Algeria. Up rose new intellectuals. Out must go the Europeans, they declared, for they do not belong. Maybe they had brought order and civilisation, but only for their own interests: maybe they had

brought European culture, but we don't want it, we want our own—so ran the familiar arguments, the same as have been used by a whole generation of self-appointed National Liberators. Agitators got to work, telling the folk in villages and bazaars that they are oppressed. Before you know where you are, they have proved to the tribesmen and nomads and people who really have things to bother about like soil-erosion and trachoma, that they constitute a separate national "personality" and that "national personalities" must entail independence, which is to be assured by them, the National Liberators — who learned their arguments (albeit arguments of fifty years before, applicable to *quite* other countries' problems) in the universities of the country they vilify, but who know also, that there are usually lucrative jobs in post-liberation governments for National Liberators like themselves.

★ ★ ★

It must emerge from any objective account of what has happened in the case of a neglected region like Algeria since the Europeans arrived that the cause of progress has been served. It is true that there have been in the history of all colonies rapacity, oppression, mistakes (but where else have there not been these?): but the overall picture, has been the establishment of the outline of civilisation.

Quite a number of flaws are detectable in the case of the Left against Imperialism. It is objected, for example, that the colonists are rather out for themselves than for the cause of civilisation: but then, that is how civilisation advances — by millions of people, out for themselves, their families and their immediate neighbours in a small way, creating a sum total which is civilisation.

Then the Left object to a European presence in say Algeria or Kenya, because the colonists tend to have the best farms, the best jobs, modern bungalows and so on, while the others live in shacks. To this it might be argued: if by some accident of history there were a community of people living the life of Anglo-Saxon tribesmen here in England side by side with our modern community equipped with democracy, state education and *Tribune* every Friday — who'd have the modern houses and the best jobs here? One thing is certain — at the rate things were going before the Europeans arrived, there would never have been modern houses and good jobs for anybody; while with European colonists in their

midst at least they might advance themselves by emulation, till one day they have those benefits too. What is the meaning of the Socialist demand for equality? Under Socialism the State gives free orange-juice and false teeth: but surely it is too much to expect the State should immediately bestow on pre-feudal, sometimes neolithic communities, all the benefits it took Europeans millennia of self-help and effort to achieve.

Other leftists, more romantic, argue that our civilisation is not worth bestowing on others. "Maybe Europeans have introduced civilisation" runs this argument, "but they didn't ask us for it, and our civilisation isn't so hot itself, what with Elvis Presley and Harold Macmillan..." Perhaps the most effective answer to this kind of argument occurred in that excellent British film about Kenya which appeared some years ago, *Men of Two Worlds*. An elderly British lady at a "sundowner" party on a veranda in Kenya was expatiating against the sin of the Europeans in coming into the colonies bearing all the paraphernalia of their civilisation; the Africans were quite happy as they were before, despite their lack of technology, in primitive Arcadian innocence. One of the other guests quite effectively squelched this romanticism: "Excuse me madam," he asked, "but did you by any chance ever suffer from hook worm?"

There is a dangerous fallacy, tinged with hypocrisy, in these arguments about renouncing colonies, colonising and colonialism. It is argued that European settlers should get out, leave colonies to the indigenous populations. Yet in the case of Algeria the Moslem population was only 2 million before the French arrived, and is now only 8 million — in an area the size of England.* They failed to exploit the country's potential, and the population remained much smaller than it could have been when scientifically developed. These are doctrinaire theories of self-determination; potentially rich lands should be left to backwardness and sloth and neglect, while European countries which could use that land are crying out for raw-materials and living-space. At this point, the Left, on its better side the standard-bearer of liberty and liberation, shows the reverse side, to which it is always in danger of being corrupted, as the embodiment of all the forces representing irresponsibility, licence and retrogression.

* i.e. the fertile area known as the Northern Departments comprising the departments of Oran, Algiers and Constantine.

The above considerations have been adduced by consideration of the situation in Algeria. As said before, we must avoid the dangers of arguments from the particular to the general — application of valid arguments to inappropriate cases.

It emerges from a consideration of the case of Algeria that imperial control by a European power is justifiable where:

1. the indigenous population is backward and chaotic;
2. the indigenous population is mixed racially and socially without national "personality";
3. there is plenty of room for European settlers;
4. there is no viable economy except by association in some larger unit (viz. an empire).

It may be, of course, that the above mentioned conditions do not exist in certain territories subject to imperialism. It could be argued that in certain countries once belonging to Empires these conditions of European domination and settlement would be inoperative. In India, for example, or Indonesia or Indochina, where there is a national personality, or several personalities; where civilisation had existed and reached high levels in social life, arts, architecture and arms when Europe was still peopled by barbaric hordes: and in which Condition 3 is particularly inapplicable because they are too overcrowded to give a decent life to all their own inhabitants, without admitting colonising Europeans. But these are precisely the areas from which Europe has withdrawn, in the Middle and Far East, since 1945. In these cases there is nothing to do but to bow before the inevitable, and accept their loss for ever: ignoring the shouts of rabble-rousers amongst them who still harp on about "Imperialists", and remembering that their future generations will look back to the age of European occupation which introduced to them dams, hydro-electricity, vaccination and constitutional government, with the same respect that we Europeans look back to the Roman age.

On the other hand there is one important sector of the globe where the four above-mentioned conditions do exist: one great continent where the social conditions, apart from the European sectors, range from the early feudal back to the paleolithic, where there are thousands of tribes and dialects, but no national person-

alities: where the area is 10,000,000 square miles, or five times greater than that of Europe, accommodating 157,000,000 people or under two thirds the population of Europe: and where European penetration and settlement is the quickest road to the general advancement of the people. That continent is Africa.

At present Africa is the one area where Europe still has the chance to expand. It still is largely dormant and dependent, under the flags of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain. However, that heritage is in danger of slipping away from the European mother countries, as Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Ghana already have.

1. The situation points to a united front. The Imperial Powers will have to stand together to defend their possessions.

2. Considering that certain of the colonising Powers, notably Portugal and Belgium, do not have the capital to develop their domains, the non-colonial powers in Europe which have vast capital resources, notably Germany and Italy, should be invited to invest in Africa. Under the present circumstances, where the African lands are farmed out only to certain historically favoured European countries, there are restrictions on outside capital, a protected market for the colonising power, and also the feeling among the non-colonial powers that even if they do invest in the colonies, the colonial powers are able to rake off an unearned cut in royalties. The full participation of Germany and Italy in Africa could only be feasible, however, in the context of a unitary policy pursued in Europe.

3. The new concept of Empire, similarly, must require the opening of all the African colonies to substantial European settlement. One major reason for the discrediting of the old imperialism is that it was chiefly a finance-imperialism, under which the colonisers lived a Sahib's existence organising the indigenous people to do dirty work for the benefit of large Europe-based companies. But putting together the two factors of the overcrowding of Europe and the spaciousness of Africa, Africa must be developed as living-space for Europeans—for people from all the European countries acting together. Considering in particular the overpopulation of Mediterranean Europe there could be great migrations of people from Italy, Greece and Spain, as well as from Britain and Holland, to reinforce the settlements in Rhodesia, Kenya, Algeria. They should be beacons of civilisation to the indigenous peoples.

4. Granted the immense spaciousness of Africa, there is room for European towns and farms to be scattered about the continent

without disturbing the ways of the African peoples. The idea of Europeans using Africans as hewers of wood and drawers of water must be stamped out by the development of a code of rights for Africans. Instead of the concept of Apartheid applied in South Africa, by which white and black are separated on a basis of superior and inferior, there must be a complete separation — of negro tribal lands and white colonial. We have no right to *impose* anything on the negroes, especially as that generally means imposing a cruel proletarian status. We should merely, by being there, invite them to follow the colonists' example as they wished, in accordance with the afore-mentioned principle of spreading our civilisation to them: which again was the policy of the Romans.

5. The effective centre of white Africa, in the military, industrial and diplomatic sense, must remain with the European.

What are the alternatives to a European Empire in Africa? First, there is the continuance of Empires conceived of as fiefs of nation states. The inexorable future of these is further revolts and humiliations for the colonising powers, as appeared to lie ahead of the Fourth Republic: or the evolution into a Commonwealth as envisaged by orthodox British thought. But consider the British Commonwealth — rising like a sparrow from the ashes of the British Empire. The British Commonwealth is a weak league based on mutual interests and agreement without formal links and organisation, and liable to collapse whenever the basis of mutual interests and agreement is withdrawn. Consider, for example, the case of Pakistan and India, virtually in a state of war over Kashmir: consider the impossible extremes represented by Kerala and the Transvaal: consider the way Ghana and Malaya are chafing, as the earners of 22% of the Commonwealth's dollars while certainly not making 22% of its dollar purchases. Raven Thomson, one evening during hard-fought discussion at Earl's Court, remodelled Voltaire's devastating judgment on the Holy Roman Empire: "The parts of the British Commonwealth," said Raven, "are becoming steadily less British, having less in common, and earning less wealth."

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Another alternative is, opening up by America. Run those Yurrupeens out, runs the American argument, and set up Demuckracy, just like back home in the States. Unfortunately this

type of homily from the Americans overlooks too many things. Ignoring the shortcomings of American treatment of backward races in the past — e.g. thier own Indians and Negroes — it ought to be asked what happens to backward countries blessed with independence in this American Age. Why, logically, they have to be set upon their feet, and who better to do it than lavish old Uncle Sam? (Honest America pays for what she takes, with no humiliating Imperialist strings attached). America pays in honest dollars; which go however into the pockets of the local rulers, casino-owners, Cadillac-dealers and courtesans: in return for which America gives no Imperialist dictates maybe, but no civil administrators nor hospitals, schools nor roads either. What people think of the all-American alternative to Imperialism was seen recently in Peru and Venezuela where Vice-President Nixon narrowly escaped angry mobs shouting "Guatemala" and "Americans Go Home."

And then there is the final alternative—Russian Imperialism. Holy Russia, with her self-appointed mission to impose the collective anti-society on the world, is already moving into Africa. Impecunious African statelets thus reduced to a tributary status to Muscovy would be only a matter of time if Europe renounced her African mission.

The final justification of a continuing European Imperialism, a continuing European world-leadership, is that the diffusing of Europe's incomparable culture is a good in itself.

BASIS OF THE AMERICAN WORLD POSITION

by JOHN R. CARVER

TO THE West European the last war was an unredeemed tragedy, an undecisive and Pyrrhic victory. But for the two great non-European powers, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, the tragedy was far from being either unredeemed or indecisive; by their actions in the second phase of World War II they raised themselves to world dominance. It is only in the light of these actions that the present day situation can be understood.

The last war divides into two phases, the aims and policies of the belligerents in the second phase being so utterly different from those in the first that it can be considered an entirely new war. During the first phase the war was a defensive one waged by various European powers against Nazi aggression. Then, between December 1941 and November of the following year the military initiative passed into the hands of the Allies and a complete readjustment of aims and policies took place. A new war began. A war waged by Stalin and Roosevelt with the object, in the first case of territorial expansion, and in the second of establishing a commercial predominance in the world. The victims of these new war aims were not primarily to be the Nazis, whose destruction was merely incidental, but every European nation.

To those who still cherish the illusion of Roosevelt on the one hand, and 'Uncle Joe' on the other, rushing in to save Europe from Hitler's grip, this may sound a drastic statement. Nevertheless, a review of the facts will show it is justified.

The more important of the two is the American position, as it is obvious to all but the politically blind that Stalin was from first to last aiming at territorial expansion at Europe's expense, but generally agreed that America's leaders were inspired in their war-time actions solely by generosity. This, however, appears on closer investigation to be very far from the case.

December 1941 can for two reasons be taken as the beginning of the turning period of the war. At the beginning of that month, to be precise, on the 6th, the Red Army for the first time assumed the offensive against the Germans; on the following day America entered the war. And it is this incident at Pearl Harbour, if investigated closely, which gives rise to the first doubts about Roosevelt's sincerity. To the world at large Pearl Harbour is seen as the treacherous blow of the powers of darkness against the unsuspecting, and all too trusting, Americans. But to the person who takes the trouble to penetrate the smoke screen thrown up by Pearl Harbour, the facts appear to be almost the reverse of the popular opinion. So far from being an unprovoked attack, the train of events leading up to Pearl Harbour was set in motion in July 1941, when Roosevelt decided to apply complete economic sanctions to Japan.

Relations between Japan and the U.S. had been steadily deteriorating ever since the spring of 1941, and the application of sanctions, particularly the stopping of oil supplies, made war inevitable. This action followed an American demand to the Japanese government that Japan withdraw her forces from China, an action quite impossible for the Japanese war party. The loss of the American oil supply, however, meant that it would be impossible for Japan to maintain her position in China, as she had no natural supply of oil, and only fourteen months supply in reserve. Unable to abandon her position in China for reasons of prestige, and unable to continue the war there without American oil, the Japanese were compelled to turn to the nearest available oil area, the Dutch and British East Indies. Invasion of this area could only be safeguarded by an operation against the U.S. fleet. Hence Pearl Harbour.

There can be no doubt that the provocation of Japan was deliberately undertaken by the American leaders, who must have been aware of the consequences of their actions. American public opinion was against entry into the war. Therefore Japan had to be manoeuvred into striking the first blow. It must be borne in mind that the American leaders realized that the Second World War could not be brought to a conclusion without America's entry

into it. I am perfectly prepared to grant that Roosevelt may have acted, at least partially, from idealistic motives. The point that it is essential to keep in mind about Pearl Harbour is not the fact that America entered the war in a rather underhand way, but that Roosevelt showed a certain brilliance in intrigue. This should always be remembered when, later on, he begins to appear to be the naive and trusting tool of Stalin. The picture of the honest but gullible President, which is generally shown by the apologists for his anti-European activities in the period 1943-5, must be compared with the true picture of the adroit politician.

In November 1942 the last possibility of a German victory vanished in the retreat from Alamein, the North African landings, and Zhukov's offensive at Stalingrad. The new phase of the war was in progress. The most glorious vistas must now have opened up before Stalin's eyes. There appeared no reason why the victorious Red Army, with its overwhelming numerical superiority, should not add the destruction of Army Groups 'A' and 'Don' to that of Army Group 'B', and, this accomplished, bring down the entire Eastern Front in ruins. There was the prospect of the Red Army sweeping through Europe while the Anglo-American forces had no foothold there. Fortunately this failed to materialize; the Red Army suffered a defeat in the battle round Kharkov, and the offensive closed down for the summer. While the Russian front line was bogged down in the eastern Ukraine, the Anglo-American forces were bringing the campaign in Tunisia to a close. The reverse prospect arose, of Stalin remaining with the Germans a hundred miles from his capital while Europe fell to Churchill and Roosevelt. But he had no need to be anxious. The mistakes made by the Führer and the ambition of the President were to solve this problem for him.

The first major clash between the American and British political and military leaders as to the strategy to be pursued during the rest of the year came after the Tunisian campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion. An invasion of France was for the moment impossible. The large Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean could not be left idle for a year. How, when and where to employ them? Two suggestions were made. The first of these was originally put forward by Field-Mashal Smuts, and gained the support of the British leaders, although in the event no detailed plan was drawn up, and it was fated to remain an idea. The essential point was that the area in which the Anglo-American forces

were to be employed should be the Balkan peninsular. A landing here would forestall the Russians and at the same time deal the German war economy a heavy blow by depriving it of the supply of Rumanian oil and grain. The Anglo-American forces were to enter the area either directly through Greece, possibly with the co-operation of Turkey, or via southern Italy; as it was likely that Hitler's satellites, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria would take the opportunity of changing sides — the first two countries did in fact contact the Allies during 1943 — the operation was perfectly feasible. It did not seem over-optimistic to suppose that the whole of south-east Europe might be liberated before the Russians appeared on the scene. The idea was suggested to the President. He was completely opposed to it.

At first, however, a decision on the matter was delayed; it was decided that a landing should be made in Sicily, and any opportunity arising from this, either in Italy or the Balkans, exploited.

Meanwhile Churchill was to endeavour to persuade Turkey to enter the war and carry out an operation against the Greek islands of Kos, Leros and Rhodes, with the object of obtaining a secure base from which to strike at the Balkans. Both these enterprises, unfortunately, were complete failures. But even this did not render the Balkan operation impossible; the Sicilian campaign had resulted in the downfall of Mussolini, and the Italian peninsula lay completely defenceless. It would have formed the perfect stepping stone to the Balkan area.

For two reasons no attempt was made to seize this glittering prize. First there was the President's insistance on unconditional surrender and his refusal to negotiate with the Badoglio government; a policy in which he was supported, for some unaccountable reason, by Churchill. Secondly there was the shortage of landing craft. This shortage appears remarkable when one considers the astonishing rate at which America was producing landing craft in 1943, and is accounted for by the fact that only 5% of the landing craft produced in that year were allocated to the European theatre of war, credit for which action must be given to Admiral King. This was at a time when Roosevelt had promised that the U.S. would devote her war effort primarily to the European theatre. Thus vanished the last hope of seizing the entire peninsula. Yet some possibility of a Balkan operation remained until the Tehran conference of November 1943. When the subject was then broached,

Stalin, as was to be expected, came out strongly against it, and in this received support from Roosevelt. The Balkan project, which still could have been carried out by quite a small Allied force, as it would have had the help of the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian armies, as well as Tito's partisans, was rejected, though the Balkans might have fallen in a matter of weeks, and the Germans had no reserves available to retake the area.

Why did Roosevelt refuse this glittering prize? He himself gave two reasons. In the first place he did not see why American troops should be sacrified for real or imaginary British interests in the Balkans, and in the second he had, so he said, a hunch that Stalin just wasn't the type of man who would indulge in imperialism. Remember that these words are not those of a political imbecile, but of the man who had so adroitly arranged the Pearl Harbour incident. They were the words of the man who was foremost in denouncing the communist regime, and its leader, before the war. They are in fact a smoke screen thrown up to cover the real reason. The first reason given is nothing more than an attempt to misrepresent the facts of the case. 'British interests' are the key words. What did the President mean by 'British interests'? It was quite clear to him that the object of the operation was to prevent Russia becoming the dominant power in Europe: surely a European and not a specifically British interest. By the words 'British interests' does he mean that Britain is undertaking the operation to establish her own domination in the Balkans, or does he mean that it would be undertaken to preserve the small amount of trade carried on with this area? No, he was perfectly well aware that Britain was interested in the area only in so far as British and European interests coincided. But the words 'not sacrifice American troops for real or imaginary British interests' would provide a much better explanation of his actions to the American public, than 'not sacrifice American troops to preserve the east of Europe from communist domination'. As for his second reason 'he had a hunch that Stalin was not that sort of man', it is impossible to believe that even an American politician can turn his convictions completely through 180 degrees. Remains the question, why did Roosevelt so vehemently oppose any attempt to liberate east Europe before the arrival of the Russians?

To find an answer to this it is best to imagine what the political scene would have looked like if the war had ended with the Red Army behind its 1939 frontiers. Europe would in the first

place have been capable of defending herself against any foe; American forces would not have been needed for protection against the Russians, and a completely independent foreign policy would have been possible in place of one originating in the White House. Secondly, Europe would have been in a sound economic position, the industrial west being united with the agricultural east. This would have meant that there would have been no need for Marshall Aid, which meant dependence on America. Finally, and here is the key to the question, Europe, united economically, completely independent of both Russia and America, would have become a rival, and probably a successful rival, to the United States in the world's trade. But with Russia in the Balkans the only potential challenger to American predominance in world trade was eliminated, and only two powers left to share the leadership of the world. Ant this could be obtained, not by undertaking but by preventing a military operation. A great prize to be gained at no cost, provided one looked at it from the short term point of view. In the long run it has meant the threat to the whole world of communist domination, but even so it has made America the wealthiest nation on earth, and the leader of the free nations.

The Balkans controversy of May-December 1943 was finally brought to a close at the Tehran conference. But it was far from being the cnly occasion on which American and European interests clashed, for it was not an isolated incident but part of a consistent policy. Several times between 1943 and 1945 Roosevelt overrode proposals for limiting Russia's territorial gains in Europe.

The first of these occasions arose in June 1944, with the suggestion that a modified Balkan strategy should be put into operation, with the object of saving Austria, Hungary and possibly Czechoslovakia from Russian 'liberation'. The Allied plans for 1944 had originally provided that part of the forces in Italy should be diverted from this front and landed in the south of France at the same time as the invasion from the north. It was hoped that this landing would both divert the attention of the Germans from the northern front and possibly form part of a pincer movement to cut off the enemy forces withdrawing from south and south-west France. Undetaken at the time the operation would have been justified, but owing to the shortage — completely artificial — of landing craft, it was impossible to undertake the operation until some weeks after D-Day. This delay meant that the southern landing became almost meaningless, and therefore the suggestion

was made by Field-Marshal Alexander, that the forces should be retained in Italy. There they could be used to pursue the Germans northward, drive them from the Pisa-Rimini line, advance across the Po, and in conjuction with landings in the Trieste area, advance into Jugoslavia and from thence into western Hungary. This proposal was rejected outright by Roosevelt, though it was supported by the American generals Clark and Eaker. The President insisted that it was necessary for Marseille to be taken in order to have a port to supply the Allied forces in the north; there was no other reason for the landing, as Army Group 'G' was already evacuating the area.

The President's claim may have been justified from a military point of view, but from the political point of view it can hardly be called a fair exchange for Austria and Hungary. Even from the military aspect the President's excuse has its weakness. There remained no hope of a landing in southern France either diverting attention from the north, or cutting off Army Group 'G': the sole object was to secure Marseille; but to take one port it was surely not necessary to employ two armies. If Marseille was the only objective, then the operation could have been undertaken without diverting so large a force from Italy as to render the modified Balkan operation impossible.

Despite desperate attempts to persuade Roosevelt to abandon the Marseille operation nothing was achieved. By August 1944 the modified Balkan plan had gone the way of its predecessor.

Some eight months passed before the next occasion for Anglo-American disagreement arose.

By the beginning of April 1945 the Allied Armies had driven in the western front, it remained only to exploit this success by a rapid and vigorous pursuit. What direction should this take? Churchill, supported by Montgomery, argued in favour of an advance on Berlin. As the Russians were breaking every agreement that they had made with regard to Poland, Churchill considered that the Western Allies would be perfectly justified in occupying Berlin and as much as possible of east Germany to use this territory, which had been assigned to Russia at Yalta, to bargain with Stalin for the freedom of Poland.

The entire U.S. military and political leadership came out vehemently against this proposal. The explanations which they give for their opposition simply fail to hold water. Eisenhower speaks of "heavy casualties" not being worth a "prestige victory". He

also says that it was impossible for his armies to advance on Berlin owing to supply difficulties. The actual facts of the situation force me to the conclusion that the U.S. leaders were attempting to misrepresent it. How were the three weak divisions that stood between Eisenhower and Berlin to inflict heavy losses on his overwhelming forces? As for the problem of supplies — these were exaggerated by Eisenhower and need not have prevented an advance on Berlin. In the event, however, Eisenhower succeeded in leaving the Anglo-American forces to mark time on the Elbe, while the Russian steamroller was allowed to plod on to Berlin. Thus east Germany went the way of the Balkans.

After the fall of Berlin Eisenhower continued to apply the policy of allowing Russia to enter Europe. At the beginning of May it seemed likely that Patton would be able to take Prague before the arrival of the Soviet army, an action which might have made it possible to preserve Czechoslovakia's independence. Once again the advance was halted. This time Eisenhower, who after Roosevelt's death had a free hand in the direction of the war, makes no excuse for his action. He could not very well do so; he could not invent 'British interests', when only American forces were involved; or heavy casualties or supply problems when there was no enemy in the way. No explanation has been offered, America's leaders admit that Prague was sold to please Stalin. When the underground in Prague rose against the Nazis and appealed for American help it was refused by Eisenhower, who had been asked by Stalin to halt on a line to the west of the city. The Czechs were therefore left to stew in their own juice until 'liberated' by the Russians. This action can only be compared with Stalin's refusal to aid the Polish rising in Warsaw in 1944. Both were equally despicable.

The American decision to comply with their part of the Yalta agreement — despite the fact that Stalin had broken nearly every clause in it — and withdraw their forces from the small area of east Germany which remained in their hands, brought the final act of the tragedy to a close.

The policy of bringing Russia into Europe is thus seen to have been constantly pursued by the American leaders. Not once, but on every single occasion when the possibility of saving territory from 'liberation' by Stalin arose, they rejected the opportunity of so doing. They starved the European theatre of landing craft. When Stalin broke his promises to give Poland independence they offered no resistance to him. On this last point Roosevelt's letter to Stalin

makes interesting reading. "The U.S. will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland which would be inimical to your interests." And we entered the war to save Polish independence!

American policy has not altered since the war; Eisenhower may belong to the opposite party, but so far as foreign policy is concerned he is Roosevelt's direct heir. When Mr. Khrushchev recently proposed that American and Russian troops should evacuate Europe, he knew that the suggestion would not be taken up. He knew that his bluff would not be called.

From the point of view of a European, west Europe plus east Europe is both economically and militarily stronger than west Europe plus U.S. support; and though there may be little hope that Russia would, in fact, withdraw from the satellite nations, every opportunity to get her to do so should be seized. We cannot expect American to do this. Nevertheless, the governments of free Europe, should be able to compel both sides to withdraw, if Khrushchev's offer is renewed, and thus bring about a free and united Europe.

SCOTLAND: THE DEATH MASK OF CONSTITUTIONALIST NATIONALISM

by EDWARD BOURKE-HALIBURTON

THE Scottish political outlook is heavily overcast. Behind those clouds of phlegm and unco-operative thought, the rumblings and groanings of a people can be heard building up to what may be a big explosion.

There is less open activity now amongst Nationalists than in any period within living memory. Every tactic of pacific constitutionalism and extra-constitutionalism seems to have been tried. An all-out effort in the recent local elections brought disappointing results. In a record low poll which denoted the profound apathy in which the whole country is sunk, the Nationalists obtained actually a smaller percentage of votes per ward than was common for them in good electoral years. One might have expected the National Party to have benefited outwardly from the growing disgust with the *regulares*, but there was no increase of the faithful. Thirty three candidates put forward in Glasgow and Edinburgh aggregated only 8% of the total poll; in the country, the Nationalists gained only two seats. Voters who had decided they could no longer support their usual parties stayed away from the ballot box altogether.

There are certain reasons for this which the constitutionalist Nationalists are unwilling to accept:

(i) A National movement has never flourished in a period of political decline. As Samuel Adams once pointed out in the context of the American Revolution: "A few of them come over to us because they believe, the majority because they fear." Despite Lamartine's apologue concerning the origins of the '48 in France and the institution of the Second Republic, people have never been converted to a political idea because they were bored. There is no-one on the constitutionalist side of the National movement who cannot be guaranteed to give his audience a good nap within half-an-hour of opening his mouth.

(ii) The Conservative and Labour Parties retain their monolithic contol of electoral business because (and not otherwise) they are primarily British parties. They get the votes because people are aware that no matter how indifferently they may function and how eminently unsatisfactory their leadership and standards of statesmanship, they operate at the source of power, which is London and not Edinburgh. The Nationalists did better for themselves when they stood as Liberals (not so much because they are Liberals, but out of respect for the Party which in 1914 put both the Scottish and Irish Home Rule bills on the Statute Book) rather than on a "simon pure" platform. Mr. William Douglas Home, the author and playwright, twice stood as a Home Ruler without conspicuous success. Yet when, recently, he fought South Edinburgh — a Government "safe" seat — as a Liberal, he took from the Tories a third of their votes, polling approximately 8,000 to Mr. Clarke Hutchieson's 14,000 thereby making the seat "marginal." Last year, Mr. John Bannerman, who is President of the Gaelic Association and a Covenant Commissioner, failed by only a few hundred votes in a twenty-five thousand poll to win Inverness; he stood as a Liberal.

(iii) Nationalist meetings are usually better attended than those of the other parties; questions are more lively and intelligent; but those who come to listen and concur, seldom vote. It was a Scotsman, David Hume, who erected common-sense into a philosophy, and it is common-sense, not idealism, which informs our people that even if every constituency in Scotland were to return a Nationalist to Westminster, they would still be ineffectual. Constitutionalist Nationalism, granted every success, could still not provide more than a replica of the Irish Party under Parnell, not a happy analogy. Moreover, we have learnt that when our Nationalists go south they participate completely in the British system. This happened to the man who drafted the 1926 Home Rule Bill and was tipped as the "First Prime Minister of Scotland": Tom Johnstone. Eventually he did come back to rule Scotland,

as Winston Churchill's Secretary of State. I mention Mr. Johnstone because no one who knew him doubted the sincerity of his conversion to Unionism. Not many Nationalists had the ability to make the British Cabinet.

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The limitations of constitutionalism were blatantly exposed in the South Uist affair. The Government decided to build a rocket range on the island in the Outer Hebrides, and were met with the protests of the islanders who faced eviction, and the resistance of Nationalists who saw in this a top-level plot to disrupt the most prosperous and compact Gaelic community in Scotland.

There were weighty strategic reasons for the Government's decision. Radar stations had been built on St. Kilda's and Tiree (which are at north and south angles to South Uist with the Atlantic) and there is a third radar installation on Rockall, due west. South Uist therefore was the obvious choice for a guided missile range facing west-north-west, or, in terms of global strategy, a "defence at depth" against the presumed line of a Russian offensive through Alaska.

These considerations were not put to the islanders, who were not consulted on the uses to which their homeland was to be put and would not have regarded them as sufficient even if they had. It was assumed that they would be more interested in the chance of earning high wages on the development project than in preserving their island as a folk-lore reservation — a typical piece of bureaucratic arrogance which turned out to be well-founded. The islanders rallied behind their priest, Father Morrison who, like Don Camillo, found his Peppone in Mr. Hamish Henderson — a poet and folk-lore authority with some relevant experience as liason officer of a Communist partisan brigade in Italy during the World War. Mr. Henderson undertook to mobilise parliamentary support for an enquiry and, on going down to London, obtained the signatures of 167 M.P.s to a petition which in other circumstances would have been enough to force a debate in the House on the issue.

Not everybody was as hopeful as Father Morrison and Mr. Henderson. The Hon. David Watson P.C., former leader of the militant Young Scotland League, resigned his brief in the Land Court after two days. Mr. Ian Hamilton, renowned as the leader

of the "Stone of Destiny" raid, wrote a powerful and serious play called *The Tinkers of the World* in which he forecast what would occur in South Uist. He said that the support of the islanders would melt under the "carrot and stick" technique of the Ministry, offering high wages with one hand and making inferences of lower compensations (in the event of the scheme being held up) with the other; the islanders' M.P. would at first sympathise with the resistance, haver, and then side with the Government; the physical force men who had been called in would be left in the pavilion.

Mr. Hamilton wrote the play as soon as the Government had announced their decision to build a range on South Uist. Entirely prophetic, it was regarded as an utterly pessimistic assessment of the Scottish character, and many people objected to it and stayed away when it was produced by the Gateway Theatre in Edinburgh last year. Everything in the play turned out to be true; fact followed fiction almost to the letter.

"The Scots," wrote Mr. Hamilton, "are not dying people; they are dead." For one significant section of political nationalism, South Uist was the funeral service.

THE POLITICAL FACE OF FRANCE IS CHANGING RAPIDLY. LOOKING BACK OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS TO DISCOVER THE VARIOUS TRENDS WHICH HAVE LED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, A FRENCH POLITICIAN ANSWERS THE QUESTION:

WHAT WAS POUJADISM?

IN THE smoke-filled Vélodrôme d'Hiver Poujade was speaking, last autumn, to twelve thousand fanatics. They had come from all over Paris and its suburbs: artisans, workers, shopkeepers, salesmen from department stores, all stocking up on enthusiasm, with eyes only for the little man on the brightly lit platform whose voice, amplified by a hundred loudspeakers, filled the vast hall. The voice was angry, the language rough. Invective and coarse jokes called forth applause and laughter. Indiscrimate attacks on the men of the establishment as corrupt, rotten and so on were acclaimed by the audience, delighted to hear opinions they scarcely dared whisper in private thus publicly expressed. Through his frank speaking, reputation for modesty, and solicitude in defence of the small man, Poujade was able to acquire the confidence and support of a whole social class threatened with extinction.

★ ★ ★

The Poujade Movement was born south of the Loire, in departments which industrial progress had passed by, where life seemed to have stood still since 1914. In these south-western provinces the population has slowly decreased and incomes have dwindled for several decades past. This stagnant existence has produced a mass

of small industrialists, artisans and retailers, who day by day sink deeper into poverty.

It was in these circles, oppressed by taxation and losing hope in the future, that the first serious opposition to the regime since the end of the war arose.

The whole thing began by chance. One fine July day in 1953 the tax collectors decided to go through the accounts of a blacksmith in Saint Céré, a picturesque little town in Périgord. It was a simple administrative routine. The arrival of the tax men nevertheless excited a certain interest among the regulars in the local Café du Commerce, and the old men playing bowls under the plane trees. An argument began which degenerated into a brawl; the tax collectors were obliged to leave empty handed. This tragi-comic episode, worthy of Clochemerle, would never have been heard of again had it not been exploited by an obscure little news-agent in Saint Céré who understood the significance of what had happened.

For the first time for many years a few resolute men had succeeded in bringing to a halt the enormous administrative machine. The little comedy became, in the imagination of these southerners, a great drama. Poujade took to himself the credit for the enterprise, and he called on the tradesmen of the district and inspired them with the spirit of revolt. A second time his efforts were crowned with success, then again and again. Poujade began a period of feverish activity, covering the entire region in his old van, backing up the tax resisters, distributing roneoed propaganda sheets, making several speeches every evening in the back rooms of cafés. A defence committee was founded, and from this grew the Union for the Defence of Tradesmen and Artisans. Members poured in; the neighbouring departments were speedily over-run. Everywhere the system of taxation was defeated. Poujade was on his way.

At that time he was thirty-two years old. There was nothing particular to relate about his past. Like most Frenchmen he was Pétainist from 1940 until 1942, then Gaullist. After the war he settled down in Saint Céré, where with his young wife he ran a small paper shop. He entered local politics and his fellow citizens elected him to the borough council (on a Gaullist list). Shortly before the incident of 1953, after two failures, he was having difficulty in earning his living. Until then his natural dynamism had found no outlet; it was the anti-tax campaign which brought

out his special talents.

From the autumn of 1953 Poujade aimed high. The Union for the Defence of Tradesmen and Artisans built up an organization, and defined its primary aims at the Congress of Grammat. Poujade assumed complete control. A periodical *The Union*, was published. The principal aims of the movement as defined at the Grammat Congress were to be non-political, a campaign against taxes. More than 400,000 members joined the Poujade movement in two years.

During these two years there were strikes of shop-keepers, homeric struggles against the C.R.S. (pretorians of the regime), demonstrations, mass meetings, all of which turned to Poujade's advantage. This bush fire swept through southern France. The Ministry of Finance admitted it was no longer master of the situation south of the Loire. Then, sure of his strength, Poujade made his first attempt in Paris. After a triumphant meeting at the Vélodrome d'Hiver on the 5th July 1954, he assembled 150,000 people from the provinces at the Parc des Expositions on the outskirts of Paris. The size of the movement amazed political experts. A new periodical was launched: *Fraternité Francaise*, of which Poujade was the sole owner. "Parallel Unions" were founded to attract peasants, workers, young people, all who were dissatisfied with things as they were. The most diverse personalities rallied to Poujade, who often rebuffed them haughtily. Subscriptions poured in and Poujade found himself in possession of enormous sums. A few months before the elections of January 1956 the Poujade movement was at the height of its power.

Until then, Poujade had adhered to his formula of "no politics", but simply direct action, which gave his movement its unique originality. At the end of 1955, however, he became infected with the fever which assails all political circles at the approach of a general election. Despite the opposition and doubts of most of the rank and file of the movement, Poujade decided to put up candidates everywhere. Recent success in local elections, chambers of commerce, commercial tribunals etc. encouraged his optimism. The election campaign was short but lively. Picturesque episodes filled the gossip columns. One former deputy, now a candidate, was locked up for hours in a cupboard; another was greeted with showers of rotten fruit whenever he attempted to address a public meeting. Everywhere Poujadist commandos harried the representatives of the regime. Their slogans were simple and direct: "Sortez les sortants," "Enough Scandals," "For the Etats Généraux

and the Fifth Republic." Poujadist candidates held hundreds of meetings, *Fraternité Française* printed 15,000,000 copies and had sixty five regional editions. Poujade was prodigiously energetic, and the verdict of the electors rewarded his efforts. Two million six hundred thousand French people voted for Poujade, sending fifty one members to parliament. Paris elected six Poujadist deputies. It was a triumph.

After this tidal wave, everyone wondered just how far Poujade would go. Power seemed to be within reach. The mandarins of the establishment were worried.

But at this moment, Poujade hesitated. The weight of the responsibilities awaiting him made him lose his usual audacity. The popular agitator was no statesman. During the early months of 1956, Poujade missed his chance. This man who had never been willing to listen to advice found himself alone with his destiny, the object of hatred or of hope for millions. And Poujade allowed himself to be overtaken on events.

Thus the régime was able once more to take the initiative; it succeeded in reducing the number of deputies to forty one — the others were declared "invalid". Poujade failed to react; he went instead to Italy for six weeks rest. When he got back he quarrelled with his best lieutenants. Uneasiness spread through the rank and file; all was incoherence; the parliamentary group voted in the most haphazard manner; a political line was conspicuously lacking.

To put an end to this, Poujade undertook a propaganda tour of France of which the climax was to be a monster demonstration in Paris in October. October and November came and went, but there was no "rendez-vous de Paris," prelude to taking power. Confusion reigned in the movement.

In January 1957 there was a bye election in Paris. Playing his last card, Poujade decided to stand. He brought five hundred faithful followers from the provinces, printed a million and a half pamphlets and posters, held a meeting of 15,000 in the Vélodrôme d'Hiver. The result was disastrous: 19,000 votes from 500,000 electors. Poujade went back to Saint Céré, cursing politics and politicians.

The end of Poujadism? Not yet. After three months of thinking over his failure he made another tour round France. During the summer of 1957 he managed to raise 60,000 subscriptions. In the west and south-west anti-tax agitation began again. In parliament the Poujadists allied hemselves with two old hands at peasant

agitation — Antier and Dorgères. A daily paper was launched in Paris: *Fraternité Matin*, with moderate success; it sold 14,000 in the Paris region and about the same in the provinces.

★ ★ ★

Examining the evolution of the Poujade movement, it appears that its influence never went beyond the shopkeeper and artisan class, except for brief moments. Poujade has always feared big cities, and has never been able to influence the industrial centres of the north and east. His propaganda tours carefully avoided the great ports and cities of industrial workers. It is in the small towns that his strength was recruited. This explains the failure of organisation at the country or regional level; indeed Poujade disliked the idea of a strong organisation, which might give too much power to rivals within the movement. He had no illusions about his own mediocrity, yet he preferred to surround himself with yes-men rather than with technicians. For this reason the "Bureau d'études," "Comité de Vigilance," and "Conseil National" remained shadow organisations with no chance of influencing the all-powerful authority of the chief. This weakness went unnoticed as long as the anti-fiscal demonstrations were the order of the day; but when Poujade was called upon to take political decisions in the name of his movement the lack of serious advisers made itself felt. The militants began to realise, to their horror, that he had no policy, but took decisions according to his mood of the moment, or day-to-day events, instead of following some definite line of action.

Somebody who had not lived in the Poujade entourage could hardly imagine the fantastic conditions in which orders and counter-orders, or decisions to vote against the Egyptian expedition, or for Pinay's investiture, or whether to stand or not in the Paris election, were taken. It was pure vaudeville.

There have have been complaints about funds, and about the seven changes of treasurer of the movement in three years. But the principal complaint against Poujade was simply his complete inability to propose reasonable solutions for the political problems of the day. Although the origin of the movement was the need for tax reform, for example, it has never been capable of presenting an acceptable project for fiscal reform. Although this was number-one argument of Poujadism, such a reform has never been the object of a serious study. So incompetent were the directors of

the movement in this important field, that when the parliamentary Commission des Finances called all the professional organisations to expand their theories, Poujade dared not accept. Later he delegated two of his lieutenants, but when questioned about their plan they only answered: "We know nothing. It's Poujade who knows!"

Poujade has been a great disappointment to his followers. His "political doctrine" was an incoherent tissue of contradictions. A collection of his articles and speeches shows that he had taken up completely contradictory attitudes over most of the subjects dealt with. Yet in spite of all this he was the hope of a whole social class which believes it has nothing to lose. If Poujadism survives, it will be because the circumstances which gave it birth have not changed.

A large number of shopkeepers and artisans is in any case bound to disappear in the near future, because of the pressure of the new French economy. There are too many of them, and the competition of the chain stores is too fierce. Knowing that they have nothing to hope from their trade unions, they either take other jobs or else join Poujade. The movement, after its political failures, decided to go back to the source of its strength, with limited objectives. In these conditions it may well continue; Poujade has probably found his vocation as an agitator on behalf of the "small man."

G. M.

SIX POEMS FROM

ULTRAMARINES

by PHILIP DE LA VILLETHEART

J'aimerais apercevoir
le traineau sur la banquise
et tâter la mousson dans la rose des vents :

Qui a voulu chanter la terre
chanter ses mouvements ondulatoires,
vague soude rochers sage coquillage et

nos mains ont lustré
le noyau de nos intolérances
au delà des lettres mortes de nos seules lumières.

Qui a voulu chanter la terre
chantera dans le ciel sans terre
et sans ciel chantera sans esprit de retour
le trémolo troublant de notre insignifiance.

Et si je vous disais
sous les rayons obliques ma lampe
qui chante et si je te disais
les mots de ton visage à cet instant me tente,
si je vous confiais
femme ingénue
femme aperçue
par tes yeux en amande plus calmes
que bleu de mer,
et si je vous disais
le fond des vases solitaires
dont les tessons plus fragiles que verre
reposent ce matin
dans le creux de tes seins.....

Pour Annie Lerouxel

J'ai aimé son visage de verre
aux algues nonchalantes
et j'aime encor son visage de pierre :
vigne vierge souci n'y ot les abeilles travaillent
coquelicots songeurs, et j'ai bu
son visage aux roseaux des rivières
j'ai su l'été
l'amande jaune enrobée de chaleur
l'immensité de ses intolérances.

Le monde souffre de moulins à prières,
je veux l'essence, le logos,
l'âme sortie de la matière, je veux
la forme linéaire des choses dévêtues
de mystère, et souffle à travers mes pores
le sang de Polydore.

A vingt mètres de fond
le ciel est rouge comme une ventouse sur
les lèvres de grottes fendues
de gorgonies aux langues
noires qui remuent le silence à reculons
du monde vu à l'envers de
ton visage pailles d'or jusqu'à
l'infini des corps allégés de pesanteur car
nous avions dans le dos l'arête du prisme
coupant le végétal au delà
des gris-bleus-gouffres-ternes qu'habite
la PEUR.

Les ennuis des anémones
s'allongent sur les sentiers battus
de mains au parfum
de luzerne par-delà l'orbite
exacerbé des choses vues
et revues au diapason
des bleus-verts la vague japonaise
se lève.

Pour Jean-Toto

Tu périras en mer
c'est la fin qui t'est propre mon ami
mon frère au large de
Sagone en touchant les méduses aux ciels mouillés
de singuliers vertiges tu périras, de
tes dents jaillira le corail et
ta chevelure lavée par les lunes vermeilles
nacreront les coquilles
closes à tout ce qui fut toi et
à tout ce qui fut moi
en ce labyrinthe où dure le mystère.

A DIARY

WHAT is the vote? A right, a privilege, a duty. If to have the privilege of the vote is the right of every adult citizen, to exercise it is a duty. And since, of course, everyone has a duty to do his duty, voting should be made compulsory. This is an argument which is being put forward in the French press at the present time.

I imagine, if ever we have the compulsory vote in England, a new sort of suffragist or suffragette will appear; there are bound to be people who conscientiously object to voting; they will probably chain themselves to railings and have to be carried struggling into the polling booths. But though you can carry a man to the poll, you cannot make him vote — not, that is, if the ballot is to remain secret. How can you make sure that he will not "spoil" his paper? And if a policeman, or a W.V.S. lady, or a boy scout, stands over him while he puts a cross in the right place — well then, no doubt, the fur would fly. Tiresome though it must be for people with a highly developed civic sense to see good votes going to waste, the alternative seems too difficult.

Perhaps it might be arranged otherwise; the electoral roll could be checked and a fine imposed on non-voters. In England now, when between a third and a half of those enfranchised abstain from voting, a rich harvest could be expected from a fine of, say, a guinea a head. Enough would be collected to pay for something popular, another "fly-over" or two, for example, like the one being built at the beginning of the Little West Road, which is apparently costing nine millions.

★ ★ ★

I have never voted in a parliamentary election in my life, not that I am a conscientious objector to voting but simply because I have never been able to face the idea of sharing responsibility for sending either of the pair of troglodytes standing, in any constituency where I happened to be on the register, to the House of Commons. They were all the stuff of which back benchers are made; vote-fodder for the Tory or Labour whips; unwavering

supporters of their disastrous leaders.

I once voted in a local council election in the depths of the country, but that was for a special reason. My vote went to the Independent candidate, just in order to help keep out a particularly fatuous Tory do-gooder from the next village. Others must have had the same idea: my man won.

★ ★ ★

In the winter our village pond has a notice board saying *Défense de Pâtiner.* In the summer they change it for one saying *Défense de Pêcher.* If it were anything to do with me I should encourage skating, which in any case only becomes possible about once every three years for a day or two after an unusually hard frost. It would be lovely to see ladies dressed up in furs and white boots dancing on the ice. True, the pond is very tiny, but not smaller than the stage of the London theatres where they give pantomimes on ice with every kind of dazzling acrobatics.

As to fishing, the French are very expert, and no doubt the poor old carp which live in the pond would soon go west, and then the frogs might croak all night long with no carp to eat the tadpoles (if they do eat them), and since the French Revolution there has been nobody to flog the water and stop the croaking.

So one thing leads to another; but all the same I should not forbid fishing. The notice I should put up would read: *Défense de* throw paper and tins about, *sur peine d'une forte amende.* The pond, surrounded by beech trees, is a favourite picnic place. But some of the picnic people spoil it with their nasty leavings. In France the wine merchants give 6d for each empty bottle returned to them, and grocers do the same for jam jars; as a result there is less broken glass than one sees in England. But paper, tins and cardboard are scattered liberally. If the heavy fine suggested were imposed, one of two things might happen: either the village could afford the wages of somebody to pick up the litter, or else the picnic parties would save money by doing it themselves.

★ ★ ★

The Impressionists are back in the *Musée du Jeu de Paume,* which has been re-decorated from top to toe. Many of the pictures have been given new frames. The result is not an unqualified success.

Each of the highly polished wooden frames seems to have been perversely chosen so that it picks up a colour from the painting inside it. Manet's *Lola de Valence,* for instance, is framed in a bright orange-brown wood which exactly matches the bobbles on the dancer's dress, while the *Port de Boulogne: clair de lune,* which is all black, white and grey, gets a white frame.

Worse still is the notion of hanging the pale grey Sisley snow scene, *La neige à Louveciennes,* on identically pale grey walls.

I think myself that pictures look their best in gilt frames against a rather dark, broken surface, like red brocade or olive-green cut velvet.

★ ★ ★

There has been correspondence in *The Times* about clapping and booing at the theatre. Some of the letter writers think it unbearably ill-mannered to boo, others that applause ceases to mean anything if it is automatic and unvarying, others again that in order to demonstrate disapproval it is enough simply to refrain from clapping.

"*Sans la liberté de blâmer il n'est pas d'éloge flatteur.*" I know this quotation from Beaumarchais by heart because it appeared in what printers call a "box" in as many as three or four places per issue of the *Figaro* during the crisis last May. They used it to cover bald patches left by the censorship.

But leaving booing, or blaming, aside, there is no doubt that exaggerated applause is a bit of a bore. Ballet performances in London, for example, call forth such gales of clapping and stampings of feet and little cries of enthusiasm as can only be compared with the ecstasies of Gilbert and Sullivan fans a generation ago. The sight of Robert Helpmann whimsically hamming the toyshop man in *Coppélia* is something I would go a long way to avoid seeing again. Yet his performance "sends" his audiences; they love every embarrassing scrap of business; they like to know what to expect from their favourites, and their favourites enjoy giving it to them. A happy family party; critical outsiders are advised to stay away. I should think that a man who booed the English ballet might easily be lynched.

★ ★ ★

The wonderful extract from Mr. R. A. Butler's speech about the

Prime Minister's statement on Jordan: "What impressed me most was when he said that he could not see what the outcome would be, but what equally impressed me was the indication that this was in fact a debt of honour, and, as such. whether one agrees or not with its motive, is transparent and its legality undoubted" — reported by *The Times*, headed *This England* in the *New Statesman* a few days later. It was sent in by Mr. Grimond, the Liberal leader. I remarked to a politician that I was glad it had thus been saved from unmerited oblivion, but he thought *This England* was not the proper place for it. "The whole point of *This England*," he said, "is unconscious humour. Mr. Butler knew perfectly well what he was saying. It was just his feline way."

★ ★ ★

A study of English and German archives apparently shows that, on both sides, there was often a disparity between the number of aeroplanes claimed to have been shot down in the Battle of Britain and the true figure. A Mr. Alan Brien has discovered the reason for this. Writing in the *Daily Mail* he says: "Both the British and German Air Forces exaggerated — the R.A.F. through careless checking and wishful thinking; the Luftwaffe through arrogance and a lying propaganda service."

So now we know.

D. M.

ELECTRONIC MUSIC

by PETER BURGESS

SURELY one of the most extraordinary experiences to be had in the modern world, is to hear a pair of electronic computers playing a duet. At the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, a small party on a recent visit to the Mathematical Services Department had the privilege of listening to Gert and Daisy, as they are called, singing "Anything you can do, I can do better," from the American musical show *Annie Get Your Gun.*

Such a performance comes within the definition of the term Electronic Music every bit as much as the quivering plaints of an electronic organ; but there is a special and much more serious meaning which is used to describe music whose composition and simultaneous performance is based on the use of electronic devices, chief of which is the magnetic tape recorder.

For many years, electronic music has been used for background purposes in experimental films shown in private cinemas throughout Europe, and a number of operas have been composed in the new technique. Use has even been made of electronic music for television programmes during the last few months. So that we need to speak not so much of an experimental idea now, but of a new art form that has arrived.

It is a fact that although recent years have provided us with music revealing a most remarkable revolution in language, the instruments used have remained the same. The tonal structure exemplified by Wagner and Debussy has been replaced by the new edifice of Schoenberg and Webern, and it is not surprising that today's composers should look to new ways of producing sound made available through technological advance by well-equipped organisations like E.M.I., H.M.V. and Philips in order to widen the scope of musical expression.

Two studios built in 1953 have been in use by European composers for some time; they are provided by Nordwestdeutsche

Rundfunk at Cologne and Radio Italiana in Milan, and are furnished with a wide range of electronic instruments. In Cologne the chief composers are Eimert, Krenek, and Stockhausen, in Italy they are Berio and Maderna; in Holland Badings and De Leeuw; the former produced an opera, *Orestes,* which received the Prix Italia 1954, a ballet, *Cain and Abel,* and film music, *The Flying Dutchman;* De Leeuw composed an oratorio, *Job,* which won the Prix Italia 1956. It is important, incidentally, not to confuse electronic music with concrete music, as created by Schaeffer in the R.T.F. studios in France. Schaeffer limits himself to concrete sound like whistles, thunder, a tap dripping; the German team, though using electronic techniques, attempt to exclude such traditions as melody, rhythm, harmony while using only the twelve-note Schoenberg scale; the others are less stringent upon themselves.

Electronic techniques are employed, then, in three ways to create electronic music: for the producton of new sources of sound, for the manipulation of these sounds, and for the reproduction of the resulting music.

By means of magnetic tape new sounds are created which may validly be called original. It is therefore reasonable enough to dispense with the intermediate microphone stage altogether, and provide the tape with sounds directly produced by a variety of apparatus. The simplest device used is the sine wave generator or audio signal generator which produces an almost pure sound devoid of harmonics, the tone being varied by turning a frequency control knob. Either glissandi or acurately pitched notes of an ethereal kind may be obtained, especially by using pure intervals exactly equal to the whole number frequency ratios of the harmonic series. A cathode ray oscilloscope, which provides a luminous graph, is used to pitch the notes emerging from the generator.

Next, there is the multivibrator which, as the parlance has it, produces a sound that has all harmonics of the fundamental up to the audio limit, the successive harmonics differing in intensity according to some slowly varying function; pushbuttons are often used as "stops" with this device.

There is also the noise generator for producing "white noise," an analogy with the colour spectrum: i.e. a constant energy distribution over the entire spectrum of audible frequencies. This is not musically very interesting, as the only thing one can do with this noise is to vary the intensity of it; but by the use of frequency band filters a quite useable pitch variation can be obtained.

In addition to the above devices, in which vibration frequencies are electrically obtained, there are mechanical devices that work in conjunction with a loudspeaker. One of these is a kind of electronic drum, really a large condenser microphone which is tapped on its diaphragm. Another is a steel sheet whose vibrations are detected by a piezo-crystal, and a great variety of effect may be evoked according to the part of the steel one strikes and depending on the method of damping. A third is the electronic clavichord, 20th century version of the ordinary clavichord.

Yet another delightful instrument is the optical siren, the pitch of whose sound output is mechanically determined by the speed of a motorised disc; variation of tone is optically produced by a paper pattern being scanned by slits in the disc which let through a beam of light; the resulting variations are converted into electrical variations via a photo-electric cell. The result is remarkable.

Manipulation of these new sound sources — which are a small fraction of those that will be devised in years to come— is achieved by volume control and the mixing of differing tonal patterns in desired proportions is, of course, the practice in broadcasting and recording studios; indeed when the method was first adopted there was considerable misgiving on the part of the public who regretted the loss of artistic fidelity. Such practice is used by the skilled composer of electronic music to produce extraordinary effects, notably by cancelling out the "attack" on notes, and by boosting a soft passage into a kind of stage whisper effect. Stereophonic reverberation, delays and other effects are obtained by an infinite variety of loudspeaker positionings in the room or hall. After all, many of these experiments have been successful in the cinema already, not to mention the more treacly type of orchestrated popular music.

A yet further range of effects is opened up by the bell-shaped variation used with such good result in *Cain and Abel;* the variation is automatic by means of an electric circuit known as a tone gate, and its length may be selected in five steps. Electric filters are in common use to select different sectors of frequencies in succeeding notes, in other words bringing to its logical conclusion the use of bass and soprano controls on an ordinary record player.

Mention should also be made of another circuit element, the modulator. If two tones are applied to two separate pairs of terminals, both tones appear at the output together with their combination tones; the beat frequency (difference between the two)

is the most prominent of these other tones, and the whole can be made to produce a chord with a "shadow", if one input is a musical chord and the other a purely electrical waveform.

Having dealt with the sound sources and their manipulation we come to the most interesting part—the magnetic tape itself, the principle of editing which is widely adopted, and may be employed to gain a further stage of variation. A short length of tape can be removed to alter entirely any part of a percussive noise. A tape may be re-played at a different speed to vary the pitch without losing harmonic strength (since this is pure, or "white", sound). Tape may be accelerated to give the effect of a player performing very fast runs. Each note can be given a glissando effect of identical type each time, by use of a constant speed motor. Sometimes, happy noises are obtained by playing the tape backwards so that each note ends on an "attack"! Finally an equivalent to stereo-reverberation results from repeatedly feeding a sound back on itself.

Enough has been said to indicate that the art of electronic music is very far from mere imitation of existing musical sounds, however possible this may be: but rather is the composer aiming at entirely new effects, frequently without any resemblance whatsoever to music as we understand it, even that written in 1958. However, during the composing proper, which now follows, an analogy with traditional music exists in respect of counterpoint. The sounds which the composer depicts in his score are produced separately by an engineer, musically trained, and transformed by him in accordance with the composer's instructions. An example might be a melody from the signal generator with a pianoforte accompaniment and rhythmic figures by the electronic clavichord and drum superimposed; four "accoustic layers" are recorded on separate tape, tuning and accurate aligning take place, and the layers are finally put together either all at once or one by one. The entire work is then ready to be performed.

It may be thought that the technique of composing music described here must lead to rigid and mechanical patterns and that there is no room for artistic interpretation. This is not so; according to Bading, the Dutch composer of electronic music, the radiophonic opera *Orestes* has been performed in Holand, Germany and England and "very striking differences in interpretation in the electronic sounds were revealed, although in none of them were the composer's intentions misrepresented." Added to this evidence, it is true to say

that the composer actually invents and performs at the same time, aided by the engineer. Thus it might be claimed that electronic music offers more, not less, scope for individual interpretation. The greater problem is likely to be in the realm of discipline, in fact.

On the face of it, the chief difference between electronic and other music is that the newer art is not performable by musicians in the presence of the public; but then neither is broadcast music, or that played on gramophone records.

Nevertheless, are concerts of electronic music really so impossible to conceive? The author recalls a visit some years ago to a studio off Shaftesbury Avenue where a performance was given of an electronic equipment which interacted with artists, among whom were a pianist and a singer; the artist and machine had a kind of conversation, and the result was shown to the audience in the form of colours flashing around a small auditorium. Now, if to this technique is added the presentation of electronic music in what one might call "variable" auditoria, it is reasonable to conceive of the public coming to a hall — probably sphere-shaped — and experiencing the effect of an immense variety of sound and light coming at him from all parts of the building and affecting him as much as a Festival Hall concert does today. Cinemas might gain most to begin with. We already have talkies, movies and, in America, smellies; the feelies are apparently envisaged also.

Music is the art of conveying artistic feeling between people through the medium of air vibration. In 1100 A.D. we liked the way the minstrels did it, later Palestrina, Mozart, and now Bartok. One need take the argument no further.

CINEMA

The Key, Law And Disorder, The Wind Cannot Read

by VINCENT MURRAY

TO FOREIGN critics British cinema often seems to offer far more than British press reviews give it credit for. Possibly this is because we at home have to take the whole range of films from own studios — not so vast as it sounds, mind you, but good, bad and indifferent have to be seen. Abroad it is selected films that critics see; hence their impression of the overall mood in the British film is frequently different from ours. We are too close to our own cinema to view it in anything like the proper perspective. What started me off on this train of thought was Carol Reed's new film **The Key**, for Reed's work is considered far more highly abroad than at home. We grant him his technical ability, but complain of his themes; we praise his direction of actors (especially children) but criticise the parts they are called on to play. From the praise received by his early film *The Stars Look Down*, and the constant urging he gets to 'approach closer to life,' one begins to understand something of the nature of the antipathy towards Reed. Critics would like to see more stories of the British way of life on the screen. They feel that such films would be far more vivid than many contemporary 'artificial' dramas. And no doubt they are right; too many British films are isolated from life as we know it today — and one has only to look at the Italian neo-realist school to realise the immense vitality such an attitude to film-making can bring. Where critics go wrong, I feel, is in assuming that realism is the only way a film-artist should take in composing his films. Reed is temperamentally more suited to other means of expressing his ideas in film.

In *The Key* Reed again tackles the theme that has been constant in his films for many years — loyalty. Loyalty to one's friend, one's lover, the society one finds oneself in, and often the clash of one loyalty with another — such is the theme in *Odd Man Out, Fallen Idol, Outcast of the Islands, Third Man*, the most important of Reed's films. Stella, in his latest film, is loyal to her tug-boat

captains who, one after the other, go to their death at sea. Her loyalty, however, extends only to the moment she is convinced of their death, then it is the turn of the next, the one who has received the key, symbol of her loyalty. Two captains are involved in the story, one, Chris (Trevor Howard) is killed after passing on his key to David (William Holden), himself rejected by Stella after passing on his key and then returning, contrary to all the règles du jeu. The film is fascinating not only in its restatement of the familiar theme, but in its portrait of men under stress. The dominant personality in a Reed film has always been a man, and his skill in depicting agonies, mental and physical, takes him further than the realists in his treatment of the human condition. His selection of Trevor Howard as a leading character in two of his films is significant, for few actors convey the torture of the mind in stress as well as he. Sophia Loren remains vague and only half-defined as Stella, for the figure is a symbol and as such cannot be pinned down. William Holden plays David with restraint and intelligence. The whole film, with its technical brilliance allied to the expression of a personal outlook on life, is typical of Reed and occupies an important place in his work.

The comic tradition in British cinema ran for years under the Ealing banner. The new M.G.M.-Ealing seems more concerned with the serious film, and the comedy talent goes elsewhere. To the British Lion trade-mark, for example, where T. E. B. Clarke and Charles Crichton have just written and directed a most enjoyable comedy, **Law and Disorder.** Michael Redgrave, who used to be so unfilmic in his acting for the screen, plays excellently as a confidence trickster determined to maintain a façade of respectability mainly for the benefit of his young son, Colin. When Colin grows up to be a judge's marshall — things are likely to be a little tricky, and the possibilities are well exploited by Clarke's resourceful script. I never thought I should have to charge Robert Morley for playing down a character, but his performance here as the judge is a little too restrained for the style of the film.

The determined tearjerker too has always found a place in British cinema, just to remind us that the film is first an industry and then an art. **The Wind Cannot Read** is a recent example of the genre, perhaps a little untypical, because of the script's attempts at a forced literacy (hinted at in the pseudo-poetic title). Dirk Bogarde provides part of the romantic interest as Flt. Lt. Michael Quinn who, on a language course in Delhi, falls in love with the other part of it, Yoko Tani, a Japanese actress playing the rôle of an instructor on the course. They marry in secret, are separated by active duty and re-united shortly before the wife's death from a brain disease. Technically the film is competent; its producer-director team (Betty Box and Ralph Thomas) used to do a lot of work with back-projection, but here full use is made of most attractive Indian settings. At least the eye can be occupied if the inanities of plot are not too distracting.

AGRICULTURAL ALCHEMY

by R. REYNELL BELLAMY

*"Farming is applied science pursued for profit." Dr. H. G. Saunders, Chief Scientific Officer to the Minister of Agriculture.**

RECENTLY I walked through a field of cabbages with a London produce buyer who, figuratively, beat his bosom and wept. With reason, because some weeks previously he had bought the crop standing, and now could find no market. It looked as if another 20 acres of apparently perfect "Christmas Cabbages" and "January King" would have to be ploughed back into the land. My companion agreed mournfully when I remarked that the brassica trade seemed to be on the decline. The housewife is no longer a regular purchaser of greens; the only really consistent customers are the bulk-buyers on behalf of the Services, H. M. Prisons, and Public Institutions. Generally speaking, it would appear that the people who now find cabbage on their plates are those unfortunates who have no say in what is set before them.

My friend from Covent Garden confirmed that taste is changing where vegetables are concerned; but he could not account for it. In my opinion the reason is not hard to discover. The brassicas have lost their flavour.

I am not a scientist; I am a practical agriculturalist of many years experience; it is from my own observation, and from the chance remarks of other non-scientific persons, that I have reached the conclusions here recorded.

Years ago, before the widespread introduction of artificial fertilizers, it was possible to enjoy cooked cabbage. Nowadays when increased production rather than quality seems to be the objective of almost every farmer, the stimulants in the form of 'artificials' are broadcast more and more heavily. The results are yields of 500 to 600 bags of cabbages to the acre, which no one wants, except perhaps a few N.A.A.F.I. buyers and sailors' lodging-house keepers. The yields

* Daily Telegraph. 4.12.57.

of former times, which rarely exceeded 300 bags to the acre, were palatable enough to be eaten at home. My own family will scarcely touch farm-grown cabbage; but garden greens raised with the aid of farmyard manure and no 'artificials' are always welcome.

Once upon a time I enjoyed potatoes too; and on the old-fashioned, conservative farm where I spent part of my youth, I could stow them away in vast quantities. Garden potatoes I still esteem; but as for those large, watery, tasteless things, often with black centres, which find their way to the shops from the big growers... one mouthful is enough. Surely it is significant that on many of the farms where potatoes are grown commercially, pepped up with anything to 10 or more cwts. of chemical concoctions per acre, a little land is set aside to be treated with farmyard manure only, to raise potatoes for consumption in the farmhouse.

It is said of one of the biggest potato-growers in the eastern counties that no manufacturer of artificial manure distributors has yet built a machine of sufficient capacity to please him.

A couple of years ago a visitor to the U.S.A. from East Anglia, on being ushered into his room in a Californian hotel, was gratified to see by the bedside a bowl of magnificent-looking mixed fruit, a gift from the management. He quickly discovered to his disgust that these fruits, for all their splendour, were tasteless and watery parodies of their European counterparts. Then he recalled the delighted exclamations of members of the American garrison at the strawberries, currants, and plums in his garden at home. Having eaten the fresh produce of Californian orchards he realised that the praise he had listened to in his Norwich garden had not been extravagant expressions of transatlantic good manners, but of genuine surprise and appreciation.

This visitor was so appalled at the inferiority of taste of much of the fruit from the great orchards of the Pacific Coast that he made enquiries into the methods of culture. He was impressed most by the prodigious amount of 'artificial fertilizer' used, and concluded that therein lay the cause of massive yields but no taste.

Where flavour, delicate and exquisite, is absolutely essential, as in the wine cellar, the French *vigneron* who produces wine of any quality will not permit one grain of chemical fertilizer to go near the roots of his precious vines. There is no doubt that the savour of many of the fruits of the earth has been dissipated by the increasing use of 'artificials'.

On light-land farms where artificial fertilizers have entirely

replaced farmyard manure, the topsoil is fast losing its former humus and concomitant consolidation. Any dry, windy springtime, when the seed-beds have been worked down to a fine tilth, these farms which carry no livestock can be distinguished by the pall of dust, actually topsoil, often carrying with it both seed and fertilizer, sweeping along before the gale to pile against banks, fill in ditches, and render roads impassable until bull-dozed clear.

It took generations of skilled husbandmen to build up the fertility of the light lands of East Anglia and elsewhere. Patiently they added to the fruitfulness of the soil with thick coatings of 'muck' carted out from their yards, and still further consolidated it with their arable sheep. Granular chemicals out of paper bags are a poor substitute for the dung and urine of the sheepfold, pressed and trodden into the ground by the 'golden hoof' of which we once heard so much. Flockmasters are few today; and many young arable farmers cnanot be bothered with livestock at all. It is not impossible that with such methods the carefully stored fertility of generations could be wasted in a few decades. The hustling smart Alecs of farming who hope to achieve marvels from the remarkable discoveries and inventions of the chemist, electrician, and mathematician, overlook entirely the inviolable and undeviating processes of nature. To them, the patient conservator of the soil who attempts to maintain affinity with nature, is known derisively as a 'muck mystic'. Remote ancestors of the human race who, on discovering that cereals grew more abundantly on Auntie's grave, instituted human sacrifice as a fertility rite, showed greater appreciation of the fundamentals of agriculture than do many of our 'progressive' farmers; and so did the old Norfolk farmer who, after listening to the protracted salestalk of the glib representative of one of the artificial manure manufacturers, exploded with "nothing goes into my land, unless it has come out of something's.....," no editor would print whence.

★ ★ ★

Farmers generally have acclaimed the newly developed pest-destroying sprays, and have availed themselves of them with enthusiasm. Some of the older generation of agriculturalists use them with mixed feelings, and misgiving. But entomologists, ornithologists, botanists, most game-preservers, and all apiarists view them with apprehension, and often real horror. These toxic

and hormone sprays have not yet been in use long enough for an unbiassed summary of the results to be given; but there is no shadow of doubt that they are bringing about radical changes in our countryside.

Where are the coveys of 20 or more partridges formerly so plentiful on the East Anglian uplands and brecks? Last summer should have been an ideal one for the nesting partridges. Yet now, in most instances, one comes across the parent birds with but 2 or 3 followers; the rest of the brood presumably has perished under the sprays, or been poisoned through eating spray-contaminated insects. It is several years since I found my last lapwing's nest; but when I was a boy and took their eggs, I could count on gathering many clutches every season merely by walking up the top of each rig of ploughland. The lapwing will not nest where superphosphates have been sown. I understand that most 'artificials' contain some superphosphates; so that is one reason for its increasing scarcity as a British nesting bird. But I have picked up several dead plovers last spring and early summer, and suspect that they too were the victims of spray, via poison-drenched insects.

Where are the pied-wagtails once so plentiful in these parts, and the yellow wagtails on the pastures? Gone too from here is the green-woodpecker, largely a ground feeder. How few have been the butterflies these last two or three seasons; the less common varieties I have not seen at all, while the meadow-browns, blues, holly-blues and even cabbage whites are comparatively scarce.

This diminution of life is tragic. Certainly we see fields of corn devoid of buttercups and nettles. Many farms where other than first class husbandry had been practised look tidier since the advent of the spray; but it is possible to pay too dearly for such benefits.

Already nature is revenging herself on the farmer. Over the past 2 years yields of clover seed have declined, not altogether due to inclement seasons, but largely, I believe, owing to a vast decrease in the humble-bee population. No one yet knows what will be the reaction of the bacteria in the topsoil to continual drenchings of spray, plus dosages of corrosive powders and crystals, over the years. Plant sickness is on the increase; when it is crops that are affected the remedy resorted to is usually further spraying.

The spraying of crops and grasses, whether with the hormone variety to eradicate weeds or the toxic kinds to destroy harmful insects and aphis, has come to stay. It is not their actual use which

is to be deplored, but the irresponsible manner in which so many farmers use them. I do not mean a reckless disregard of wind and drift, the consequences of which could mean financial loss, but a disregard of the possible consequences of repeated and wholesale sprayings. They are reckless in that they tend to forget the methods of good husbandry to rid themselves of their weeds, but have come to depend on the spray to do the job for them. Some have, in fact, let spraying become almost as much a routine job as harrowing in the seed, with the result that much of the farm is deluged each season with various concoctions inimical to insect and bacterial life, whereas the operation should be used as an emergency measure, and only when thanks to bad weather or bad farming, some particular weed looks like getting out of control, or when the 'black fly' is ruining a field of roots.

Not to use a toxic spray to exterminate, let us say, a swarm of locusts in Africa, would be folly; but it is an equal folly to deal death to every living creature sheltering in and under a root crop, and in the banks, hedgerows, and ditches surrounding that particular field, just in case yellow virus might put in an unwelcome appearance later.

More and more seed is treated with poisonous substances, sometimes deadly, to act as fungicide or as protection from the ravages of wire-worm and leather-jacket.

Owing to my lack of scientific qualification I hesitate to dilate upon any possible connection between the chemists' assistance to farming, and human health. But I must mention that a German agricultural scientist of my acquaintance once assured me that at the Rudolph Steiner Agricultural Institute in Germany, mercury had been traced from the seed wheat to the loaf. Nowadays almost all seed wheat is treated with mercury. Anyone who has read of the experience of Voltaire's unfortunate Doctor Pangloss will know what happens to the human body when continuously subjected to an intake of mercury!

To crown it all, the 'back-room boys' of agricultural science have produced some stuff called "hexoestral" to hasten maturity in livestock and produce lean meat. This sounds well enough... until we recall that hexoestrol is given to bitches to bring them into heat out of season. Dr. Allan Fraser writing to the *Farmer's Weekly*, 3. 1. 58, from Aberdeen adds: "...the housewife ... might hesitate to feed it to her sons — perhaps hesitate even longer before feeding it to her daughters."

Already the chickens are coming home to roost. In East Anglia is a group of large arable farms, run on the most modern scientific lines, where no hoof sullies the soil, no weed dare show itself, and where the fresh scents of springtime are drowned by the stink of "sprays". Here a disease, hitherto unknown, has attacked the sugar-beet, of which a vast acreage is grown in that locality. On some farms it has been serious enough almost to amount to crop failure. Neither stepping up the quantities of artificial fertilisers nor spraying against every possible contingency has brought any solution.

Soil experts, real ones from Rothamstead, were consulted. Verdict: "all humus gone, and certain vital trace elements exhausted," and nowhere was the land in poorer fettle than on the farm in which one of the high priests of modern agricultural alchemy is directly interested. I, an ignorant bumpkin by comparison, who would not dare to debate with so qualified an authority as this scientist, have long predicted that what has come to pass would come to pass. Yet this alchemist and his disciples are shocked and dismayed at the result of their attempt to steal a march on nature.

The fertility of the soil is God's greatest gfit to this planet. He who risks impairing its fruitfulness imperils the existence of every living thing.

LETTER

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND RACE

To the Editor of *The European.*
Sir,

Mr. Gregor's very interesting article on National Socialism and Race in your July issue sets me wondering whether the experts on racial history have got it all wrong, or whether Mr. Gregor has got them all wrong. It is a little difficult to check up on the references to quotations appended at the end of the article, as many refer to works no longer in print in England.

However, I have read a great deal of Guenther, Houston Stuart Chamberlain and Alfred Rosemberg, as well as the history of white (or as most call it, western) civilisation, and I find nothing fantastic in coming to the conclusion that the predominantly white man has formed the racial basis for the most highly developed civilisation the world has ever known. I go further, and say that unless the white races are preserved, civilisation will degenerate to the standards of the undeveloped peoples of the world.

There seems to be a confusion in the minds even of enlightened men and women concerning the difference between "civilisation" and "culture". The great civilising nations of the world have not always been the creators of the cultures of the peoples they have conquered. History gives more than one instance of the opposite taking place. Such a one is that of the Manchus, whose conquest of the Chinese brought law and order to that complex of peoples. The Manchus, however, did not create the culture of the Chinese but rather assimilated in themselves.

Again, in Mr. Gregor's quotations, we note the confusion of thought between the individual of a race and that of the race as a whole. Genius is not always embodied in a purely racial type; genius is so individual that such an idea is ridiculous. The "brachycephals of note" mentioned on page 279 of part III of the article, such as Hindenburg, Bismarck, Kant, Beethoven, etc., were none the less Germanic for being physically out of line with the Nordic type. The quotation from Rosenberg on page 275 shows that the National Socialists were not quite so foolish as to believe that a man could be valued by his appearance.

Guenther noted three main types which made up the European peoples; Nordic, Mediterranean and East Balts. (the Alpine and Dinaric seem to be minorities). It may not be possible to agree with him in all his ponouncements, but I do not think it unreasonable to presume that Nordic man has formed the backbone of the white peoples and that the more this strain is eliminated the weaker the race becomes. Whether or not the ancient ruling races in India were right or wrong, they believed that the whiter the skin, the higher the caste. They called themselves Aryans, the name given to the Indo-Germanic peoples of Europe to-day.

Yours, etc.,

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