THE EUROPEAN

THE JOURNAL OF OPPOSITION

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ANALYSIS by ***EUROPEAN***

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ANALYSIS

"THE fifteen Nato nations have not become a clear Nato lake —they are more like a group of fifteen national puddles"—. "It is fundamental in all planning that the political and military bodies should work side by side." How can they work side by side when Europe is still politically divided into national puddles with the conflicitng policies of different national interests? That is the decisive political question which arises from Lord Montgomery's acute technical analysis in his lecture to the United Services Institution.

The military technician confesses that his job cannot be done without the political decision we have long postulated: Europe a Nation. And, if the economic technicians had a similar honesty of mind and clarity of view, they would make the same confession. It is becoming increasingly clear that these national puddles must soon disappear. They will either emerge into the lake of Europe or be absorbed into the Soviet or American systems; militarily and economically they will not much longer be capable of independent life. Technics begin to compel politics. A political vision will in the end be realized by practical necessity.

A wide area of agreement

All Europeans will be obliged to Lord Montgomery for his technical reinforcement of their main political theme. A practical and bitter experience has led him to this conclusion in the basic matter of organization. He expressed the view that when each side reaches nuclear sufficiency, all-out nuclear war will be very unlikely; that has been our published opinion for over seven years. He emphasized the necessity for conventional forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons, for possible use in minor but important struggles which would not be vital enough for either side to risk world destruction by use of the major weapons. He emphasized that Russia would try to cause our economic downfall rather than risk her own life in full scale war. These are all opinions that we have long expressed.

From puddle to muddle

But the Field Marshall treads on less firm ground when he enters the political-economic sphere and considers the area he might be called upon to defend. His view here appears to some

extent conventional and confused. He apparently believes that Western Europe must depend on a "world-wide economic system" and that the battle ground will lie in remote regions, including Asia. To support the enormous burden of conventional forces necessary to the defence of this wide area, Europe in his view must depend on America for the main nuclear weapons, and also must reduce in our planning the relative importance of Western European defence in favour of these far flung defences of largely imaginary sources of supply.

So we must continue to be an American dependent in the main weapons, and must concern ourselves much less with the general defence of Europe. Why?—in order to defend Asia. Why?—because Asia is vital to our economic system. To which the short answer is: Asia is nothing of the kind. It is here that the Field Marshall moves from the puddle to the muddle. But we are still most grateful for his emphasis of the main essential which is European Union.

Concentration, not dispersal of strength

Asia is in no way essential to the economic life of Europe. Everything we require can be produced in Europe-Africa. It could also be produced in Europe-South America. In fact, concerning food and potential raw material supplies we have an embarrassment of riches in the choice between Africa and South America. It is quite unnecessary to enter Asia; it is worse, it is a most dangerous dispersal of strength, a dissipation of energy and resources we need for things that really matter. It is worse still, it provokes conflict with the Soviets without any reason.

This Asian preoccupation violates every military maxim which requires concentration rather than dispersal of force, and every political maxim which requires concentration on objectives which really count. The loss of all Asia in terms of reality does not matter a rap to Europe in modern conditions. It merely means that the Soviets take over the burden of paying for the present upkeep and future equipment of its indigent population.

An obsolete nightmare

The Kaiser's old nightmare of eastern masses moving against the West is years out of date, as the Field Marshall must well know. The hordes of Genghis Kahn would go down like summer corn in a cyclone before machine guns and tanks, let alone the nuclear weapons whether tactical or strategic. We are ages beyond all these old fears.

The future belongs to quality, not to quantity. Hungry, illiterate masses are a liability to European peoples, not an asset; the concern of missionaries, not of marshalls. Our interest in Asia is neither economic nor military; it can only be charitable. And charity begins at home.

To make Europe an American dependancy and to jeopardize her defence for the sake of holding Asia against the Soviets, is simply the last frenzy of a bankrupt system which has to give away surplus production because it has failed to organise its home economy. It is an archaic confusion which the dutiful Field Marshall has taken over without question from his political chiefs; the croakers of the small puddles.

If he would think in terms of Europe-Africa as political economic-military unit, he would see strength enough to be independent of America in the main nuclear weapons, and to be self-sufficient in the modernized conventional forces necessary to defend our concentrated supply system. Unity of system and command would replace the puddles, equal friendship with America would replace dependency, and a secure economic and military system would replace a dangerous dispersal of weak forces which invite attack.

The West still in danger

To denude the West of conventional forces in favour of remote concentrations on illusory objectives, can be a very dangerous error. There is too much complacency in the view that the West is entirely protected against attack by the great deterrent. Would it, in fact, in all cases deter? Supposing civil war occurred in some part of Europe; in the confusion of such events it might be promoted by a strong Communist Party in some country which so arranged matters that it could successfully disclaim responsibility. Considerable disorder and bloodshed might arise. Supposing Russia then said that in the interests of humanity it must temporarily intervene and pass through Germany to reach some objective; adding that, of course, if any criminal trans-atlantic barbarians etc. etc. were so insane etc. as to use the great deterrent against Moscow in order to interfere with this humane mission, every city in America would be razed to the ground that same night. Is it quite certain that all American presidents would then press the button which could result in world destruction?

Only a united Europe can be strong enough

Is it quite certain that no occupant of the Kremlin would ever take the gamble? If it came off, because the West neither dared

to use the great deterrent nor had sufficient conventional forces available in Europe to meet the danger, all Germany and much of Western Europe might be occupied without effective resistance; the balance of world power would be altered finally and disastrously. These things can happen if we chase a will-o-the-wisp of illusory interests round Asia, until the dispersal of strength dangerously weakens the heartlands.

Again we come back to the key problem. A completely united Europe alone can be strong enough both to possess the great deterrent and sufficient conventional forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons to guard the supplies which are really vital. At present we are dependent on America for the great deterrent, which may not be used by a president who refuses to sacrifice the life of America to save a Europe which is busy throwing its own life away. We are asked in addition to diminish conventional forces already inadequate to the defence of Europe in order to guard Asian positions which are of no real use to us at all. Let us learn the two most important things in life: what matters and what does not matter. We shall then make Europe, and leave Asia.

European Union and Arab Union

The Field Marshall was very right in stressing the importance of unity in our economic as well as in our military policies. He was right too in emphasizing the necessity of holding Africa, and in condemning the failure of America to realize this priority. We regret to differ with him over Asia, which for an undefined reason he finds important, and over the Arab question which for a defined reason he finds unimportant. His reason for dismissing the Arabs is that in his view they can never unite except against Israel. They might reply that Europe has never yet succeeded in uniting for any reason. Such union, or any other great human development, only comes under the stress of necessity. It comes when it must come, not before. Our time has come in Europe, when we must unite or succumb. The same point may lie not far ahead for the Arabs; it is already clear to any Arab eyes with vision.

If the Arabs are capable of uniting and playing again an historic roll, recent English policy in this region has been fundamentally wrong. We have made many presents to Russia, and, from our standpoint, this may prove one of the most disastrous. It is not too late to attempt a policy of understanding with the Arabs which is more in accord with British tradition and genius.

In short it is high time that some general staff sat down in London and worked out what matters to Britain and what does not matter: the Arabs would be found in the former category. Above all it would be found in terms of real policy that the union of Europe matters to the English people and to every other people of this Continent, and that everything else is as dust in the balance.

Great Britain is now quite clearly in danger of parting company from Europe. For years our government has been the chief impediment to European union. But at the breaking point, "France the Wrecker" is the heading of a *Times* leading article (18/11/58). Why?—Can it be denied that M. Soustelle spoke truth when he said "The Free Trade Area as wished by the British" would be "without a single external tariff barrier around the seventeen countries and without harmonization in the economic and social sphere." No one attempts to deny this is British policy. And can it be denied that this veto on the first essentials of any effective economic union in Europe makes nonsense of any attempt to develop Europe as an economic, let alone a political entity? The plain facts are that the Common Market countries are taking the first, all too slow, hesitant steps towards the economic and political union of Europe, and that the British government for all practical purposes will have none of it.

Mr. Soustelle in the B.B.C. broadcast of "To-Day" (19/11/58) is reported to have said: "It is time to regard Europe as a nation." So far as we know after over a decade of ardent advocacy of "Europe a Nation," it is the first time this phrase has been used outside these columns. The principle is now at least declared as an ideal by the spokesman of France; it is opposed root and branch by the government of Britain and also by the Labour Party. This is an issue the British people as soon as possible will be asked to decide.

The brake instead of the accelerator

The British establishment attitude is worse than the usual negative to any great conception. There is also a very positive attempt to have the best of both worlds. Is it really surprising that the French should object to us useing a differential tariff to obtain raw materials cheaper than the Common Market countries and thus to give ourselves an unfair competative advantage on the Common Market? Is it surprising that the six countries should object to being bound to some extent by a harmonisation of social policies while we are left free to employ other devices which might

well reduce our competitive costs on the markets they are required to throw open to us? As *The Times* observed the "Undertakings in the Community Treaty" concerning "the harmonization of social charges and the like" are "nebulous in the extreme;" they represent merely the most hesitant and ineffective steps in the direction of Europe a Nation which we have long regarded as far too slow and timid to meet the gathering menace of the situation. But is that any reason why the government of Britain should seek to sabotage even the little that has been done? Once again Britain plays the brake instead of the accelerator, the drag on the present inadequacy rather than the inspirer of more vigorous policies.

The danger of exclusion

The Times suggests that to both France and Germany "the degree of semi-political unity is more important than that of the economic unity which the community might bring" and that they have the "hope of further forms of unity being built thereon." That is clearly the case, for none could claim that anything very effective in the way of political and economic unity has yet been achieved in Europe. But are not the old parties in Britain in fact entirely opposed to any advance of any kind toward Europe a Nation? It is a clear question to which they must sooner or later give a clear answer.

Will not the present attempts to have the best of both worlds—the spoilt brat of the Western World attitude—end in the usual muddled nonsense? Will British government at length tumble into the decision it will not take, by being pushed out of the Europe whose progress it has too long delayed? This is a mortal danger to the British people.

Choice between Europe and black Commonwealth

Are we not reaching the point of a clear cut choice between American dependency and the black commonwealth on the one hand, and the Union of Europe and White Africa on the other. We put the question in this form because we believe that half the dilemma Mr. Maudling posed to the French is true. He asked them whether they would like Australian wheat and Hong Kong textiles being freely sold on their markets? We believe the true answer in the European interest is: Australian wheat Yes, Hong Kong textiles No. And the reason for this reply is purely practical; Europe should not only tolerate but benefit from any degree of competition from peoples on a similar standard of life, but can-

not possibly stand on its own market competition from much cheaper labour which is equipped by international finance with the same machines. There is no reason whatever why 300,000,000 Europeans should not consume the wheat of Canada and Australia in addition to the wheat of Europe, and the butter of New Zealand in addition to the butter of Europe. Any initial surplus would quickly be met by orderly marketing methods such as we already employ in Britain and, above all, by raising the standard of life in the poorer areas of Europe through continental investment policy and the kind of measures which Mosley describes in his book *Europe: Faith & Plan,* under the broad title of the wage-price mechanism. There is nothing which cannot be produced in Europe or in the white overseas territory which 250-300 million Europeans cannot consume, and a relatively easy levelling up of conditions in comparable industries within a controllable area can make such competition fair.

Black colonies now an impossible burden

But the flooding of the European market with cheap textiles from the sweated industries of Hong Kong is an altogether different question. And these problems will grow soon to a point which will wreck the whole development of Europe if the question is not faced and an early decision taken. Finance Capital will pour into the backward areas of the black colonies to gain greater profit by the simple process of supplying modern, simplified, rationalized machinery to primitive labour under the direction of relatively few white technicians. The resultant competition within Europe-Africa will be disastrous.

It is good to hear that Mr. Soustelle observed in the same interview: "the development of Europe cannot be considered without the development of Africa." Again, we have said it with reason and passion for over a decade. But let us think the matter out to the end. If this system is to work, it must be a white Europe-Africa, which will maintain fair internal competition between areas with a comparable standard of life. Otherwise two things are going to occur: (1) a long and painful period during which the European peoples will deprive themselves of a substantial part of their own production in order to enable finance capital to equip the black colonies with the resultant productive surplus in the form of loans. (2) A still more painful period, in fact a permanent situation, in which the black colonies thus equipped will compete with their cheap labour costs in every European market in a

manner disastrous to European industry.

Now we want independence!

The choice is perfectly clear between developing an European and white African system on a fair and stable basis of life, and including black colonies which would demand an initial abstinence from the use of our own production for their benefit, and would procure our final downfall with the means we have thus painfully provided. The remedy in principle is simple: Grant the black colonies the independence for which many of them have so long agitated. We should say: "You want freedom, now you can have it." "You have long wanted independence from us; now we want independence from you."

The relatively empty areas like the Sahara will of course remain within the European economy*. But why keep the black colonies, which in reality are only bound to us by the lively hope that we will provide the capital for their development at the expense of our own development? Does any realist imagine that they will stay with us long when the process is complete, except to capture our markets and make greater profits for their financial promoters than can be won by developing Europe on a fair basis of internal competition and of healthy national life? And what can they give us which Europe, white Africa, the empty areas of Africa and the overseas territories of Europe cannot provide.

They can of course send to us a surplus of things we produce already with unfairly competitive prices based on cheap labour conditions which would wreck our economy. If this is to be the end of Europe-Africa, we might as well stay where we are and face the dumping of America and the Soviets on world markets. How much better to allow America to discharge the surplus she can find no means of useing at home by supplying the new independence of black Africa with the capital it lacks. if the black colonies in effect join the American economy, it would in the end be pure gain for us. America will have the problem, and we shall have the healthy economy which contains every foodstuff and raw material mankind can require and is based on fair, internal, competitive conditions throughout.

The universal juggler and the crash

There are problems which Europeans should be facing together. So far Europe is not even thinking seriously about them; a little

*Algeria is important to all Europe because it is the means of access to these rich areas of supply.

jumble of committees haggling about tariffs around a system which in its present form will not work, is the nearest approach. Meantime Britain wants liberty to juggle with all means and to employ all manoeuvres in all spheres: American dependence spelled with the ridiculous perversion of the truth which is interdependence; the attempt to use a little longer the assets of the black colonies and the attempt to postpone the dark day when we have to repay what we owe and the still darker day when we have to lend instead of to borrow, to be exploited rather than to exploit; the tiny trade with Russia which manipulates a hand to mouth existence by sending the Soviets vital capital goods in return for junk we do not need, until they have enough not only to do without us but to use what we have supplied for our own ruin; the hire purchase boom directly a fortuitous drop in commodity prices relieves us momentarily from balance of payment difficulties, until the resulting impoverishment of our overseas customers combines with our own debauch to make the whole problem worse; in short, playing fast and loose with everybody and everything, but most of all with our own future. It is the most remarkable juggling feat of history which fascinates the performer and horrifies any intelligent onlooker. If the juggler drops anything even for a minute the end will be the biggest crash in history. For this result, Europe is sacrificed.

Big luck and small tricks

How long will the big luck and the small tricks last? How long will the present system in Britain survive? Whether it will be a few weeks, or few months or a few years is anyones guess, the only thing certain is that it cannot last. It may crash very quickly; for instance, at once if American inflation has to be severely curtailed to put through the pending funding operations in face of the flight from bonds and even from the dollar itself which is caused by the inflation that alone maintains the industrial demand of the crazy system. Read the real figures beneath the optimistic headlines in the financial press, they almost always contradict each other; read for example the analysis in the *Financial Times* leading article of 17/11/58 concerning the British motor industry on which the whole structure of our flimsy economy depends at present; read our leading orthodox economist Mr. R. Harrod in the same issue, and also his previous article in the American magazine *Optima;* study the extent to which the facts, supplied by these and other authorities, if not the conclusions,

coincide with the recently published analysis of the chief Soviet economist, Varna, who exults in the over-production crash which is going to follow the last investment boom in the West: then ask yourself—if you were in the position of an insurance company—what premium you would require to insure for the next few years the economy of Great Britain. It is indeed time to start thinking about an answer; certainly time to stop destroying the new Europe, which will be the only alternative to communism when things go wrong.,

Khruschev, Berlin and Gaitskell-Rapacki Tories

The final disgrace of English conservatism is manifest in the reception of Mr. Khruschev's Berlin move in certain Conservative circles, though, admittedly, not in all. The high spirit of these European patriots says in effect though, of course, not in words: "Very well, if you will not let us work our little tariff wangles on your Common Market, we are all for letting the Russians have the Germans." So the malevolence of English conservatism is impelled by its failure to organise the whole world to its own advantage into an unholy alliance with the Germanophobia of English socialism and the myopic reaction of the narrowest German nationalism for the purpose of wrecking Europe in the unconscious service of a brilliantly directed communist policy whose final objective is far beyond their understanding. After their rebuff in the European negotiations, they join with the Gaitskell-Rapacki policy of detaching Germany from Europe in order to constitute a small central prison, where a neutralised disarmed Germany will be placed in impotent confinement beside Poland and Czechoslovakia. Having impeded the full union of Europe for years, this is their new device for breaking up even the common market. In this design they are powerfully aided by the nostalgic obscurantism of all the older elements in German nationalism who seek occasion to play the old power politics between East and West; they live so much in the past that they have not noticed they no longer possess either the Prussian army or Prince Bismarck, and under these conditions would have no chance of acquiring nuclear rockets or any means of becoming anything except a handcuffed prisoner in a padded cell. The only immediate explanation of this extraordinary scene is that the gods seek to destroy the Europeans. The situation is a challenge to the sanity and will of Europe, and the final response may decide the fate of men.

EUROPEAN

"OVER-PRODUCTION" AND THE EUROPEAN ANSWER

by ROBERT ROW

FOR six years of war there was no unemployment problem in Britain. Scarcity of labour was the rule, to the extent that housewives were directed to vital jobs in industry. No machinery stood idle; munition work made such demands on it that many consumer goods had to be rationed. The old system demonstrated that it could be made to work during war if not during peace.

It also worked to some extent during the years following the war; there was a large back-log of demand for consumer goods which had not been satisfied during war-time. There was the destruction of the war itself to be made good. In 1950 there followed the Korean War, which provoked a new arms boom.

But the position is very different today. It is returning to "normal," and the most ominous feature about this normality is the return of marked "over-production." Most marked is the fall in world commodity prices. The *Financial Times* Commodity Index recorded on 22.9.58 a drop to 78 from the 100 of the mid-1952 peak at the time of the Korean War boom. That is a fall of nearly one-quarter in price.

There are world-wide gluts in many commodities. These are largely due to the big investment booms of the middle-1950s, which were encouraged by the stockpiling activities of Western governments in reply to Soviet aggression. But Soviet aggression has not been repeated since the Korean War. The political dynamics of the H-bomb are now in operation. A big war in the old style is very unlikely today, as Sir Oswald Mosley has emphasised since 1950; he has been proved right by the failure of the Quemoy and Middle East crises of this summer to explode into total war.

Yet every primary-producing country has been encouraged by stockpiling on the part of the big industrial countries to turn out

more and more goods by better and better equipment, supplied by those industrial countries. These schemes have borne fruit in the shape of enormous quantities of commodities just when demand slackens off, with the completion of the making-good of the losses of the last war and with little prospect of the next war breaking out. *The Economist* of 21.6.58 wrote:

> "But a fall in commodity prices . . . would have occurred . . . . This was made inevitable for metals particularly, but for some agricultural commodities as well, by the large capital investment that stockpile buying had called into being. Sometimes actually aided by Government investment, the productive capacity still existed when the American stockpile programme was substantially completed."

Under the old system, great productive organisations are called into being, for which there is little use once the immediate scare is over. Someone has to carry the baby of resulting surpluses.

Already these countries are taking defensive measures. Imports are being cut, as hard times return, with their commodities bringing less on world markets. New Zealand is a case in point. Last September she revised the Ottawa agreement with Britain of 1933, which gave British exporters the protection of a 20% preferential margin. Now British goods sold in New Zealand will have to rely on competitive ability to hold their share of the market.

In September, also, New Zealand signed a treaty with Japan, giving Britain's Asiatic competitor "most favoured nation" rights in the New Zealand market. In October New Zealand announced she was cutting general import licences by 10% in 1959. (She was also obliged to pledge her entire gold stock in return for a loan from Wall Street). This is a classic example of a valuable British market being obliged to contract following a commodity slump due to "over-production."

A second example is the decision by President Eisenhower to impose a new import quota on lead and zinc imports into the United States, running at 80% of average annual figures for 1953/57. The President introduced this measure, it should be noted, shortly after winning a long battle for a "liberal" trade policy with Congress: so much for the new liberalism. His action led to world-wide protests from commodity producers which have hitherto looked on America as a profitable market. Australia was particularly bitter: Senator Spooner, Minister for National De-

velopment, said "it would be a long time before Australia forgot the United States action this week in reducing lead and zinc imports to an unexpectedly severe degree."

The Times of 25.9.58 claimed that the American action was "no surprise"; American home producers of these metals had been "very restive" for a year. Sir Oswald Mosley also was not surprised: ten years earlier he had been warning that Americans would not put their own workers out of jobs in order to keep other countries' workers in jobs.

But Australia and New Zealand are by no means the only primary producers suffering from price declines. *Time* magazine of 26.5.58 reported that:

> "Chile's copper exports will be off some $225 million this year, pushing the country into an overall $95 million trade deficit. Bolivia, which gets about 80% of its export money from tungsten, lead, tin and zinc, whose prices are off as much as 30%, is in the same economic fix. So are metal-producing African exporters such as Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo, whose exports of non-ferrous metals were hit by a 9% price decline in the first quarter of 1958 alone. The world's big South American coffee producers are little better off.
>
> "Pakistan has lost considerable ground because of a sharp fall in cotton (23% of exports) prices and a drop in the volume of its jute (44% of exports) trade. Indonesia is sorely pressed by a 20% drop in crude rubber prices since 1956; so is Thailand. Malayan tin exports are off 50% this year and 25% of its tin mines are closed down."

The Times of 6.6.58 pointed out that the effects of the commodity slump would cancel out the benefits of Western aid for underdeveloped countries; that a wave of anti-Americanism was spreading in Latin America because of higher U.S. protective tariffs; that the commodity-producing countries were heavily overspending their incomes and running down reserves on costly development schemes.

How can the big industrial countries of the West maintain their previous high rates of manufactured exports in face of this universal decline in demand; particularly Britain, which under the present system needs to export 30% of her production to keep up her present high standard of living and which has over 50% of her markets located in the badly-hit primary-producing Commonwealth?

"Over-Production" is not confined to the backward countries of the earth which rely on commodities for a living.

The *Financial Times* of 27.9.58 showed:

> "The last boom was a capital investment boom; expenditures are now running at little over $31,000 million against a peak of $37,000 million; and guesses at the amount of spare manufacturing capacity (admittedly weighted considerably by the automobile industry) range up to 30%."

So American industry has been "over-equipped" to such an extent that it can carry the highest living standards in the world, the biggest armament boom in the world, great give-away aid projects all over the world, the vast production needed for inter-continental rockets, earth satellites and moon rockets—and still be

This under-employment of industry is having the inevitable repercussions; American businessmen are not the kind to carry costly equipment that is unlikely to be used. On 10.6.58 the *New York Herald Tribune* said:

> "The Government reported yesterday that United States industry is reducing its capital spending more deeply and more rapidly than expected. Businessmen will buy only $30,700,000,000 worth of new plant, machinery and equipment this year, or 17% less than in 1957, the Commerce Department announced."

So American contraction of industry looks like continuing, —with serious effects on the rest of the free world in which America has become the king-pin.

The plain fact is that, under the old system, the ability to produce has far out-run the capacity of the West to find big enough markets to absorb this production; science has been allowed to develop one side of the system to the detriment of the other. It is lop-sided, where it should have a scientifically-designed market system to balance scientific production. In the past it relied on war and the opening-up and equipment of new countries in the East to keep the system working: today a big war is unlikely because of the H-bomb, and Wall Street does not see why it should equip Eastern countries which have a "fifty-fifty" chance of going communist (as one American Ambassador has described India).

Mr. Roy Harrod, Britain's outstanding orthodox economist,

summed up the situation in the *Financial Times* of 28.7.58:

> "A world recession is on: so far it has not become severe; but there are no factors yet visible likely to make for a major revival, and past experience suggests a further deepening, which would be a disaster for the free world. The Americans are likely to do their utmost to pull themselves up. But what, with the best will in the world, they can do is not likely to suffice to pull the world up."

Exactly: America can save herself, behind high tariff walls, but what can the rest of the world do?

Europe is going ahead with a scheme of its own. The six countries of the Common Market, grown tired of nagging and obstruction from London, are vigorously setting up a political and economic federation behind high tariff walls. But they have two big disadvantages which America does not face: they are obliged to draw many raw materials from outside their own borders, and their programme for complete union is likely to be far from complete when the final stage of crisis sets in. These factors will be decisive in the coming crisis.

But Britain is in the worst position of all. Run by effete politicians, who have petulantly refused to co-operate with the other Europeans, this country has shut herself out of the one certain refuge in the coming storm and tied herself firmly to a waterlogged Commonwealth.

It is true that, at the moment of writing, Britain has a record balance of payments. But how has it been gathered? Mr. Andrew Shonfield, Economic Editor of *The Observer*, explained with his characteristic frankness on 19.10.58 that:

> "We were the beneficiaries of the fall in world commodity prices, which is now causing so much trouble to the primary producing countries. This windfall, together with a reduction in the amount that had to be paid for hiring foreign shipping, accounts for almost the whole of the improvement which took place between the crisis period in the second half of 1957 and the period of recovery in the first half of 1958."

The British Government's "achievement" is the result of their doing precisely nothing but allowing suddenly favourable factors to reward them with a record surplus of foreign exchange receipts,

amounting to £334 million for the first half of 1958.

But as Shonfield points out, the deficit of the rest of the Sterling Area amounted to £475 million, and was more than enough to wipe out Britain's record surplus. One thing only prevented the rest of the Sterling Area from drawing heavily on their sterling balances, of which Britain still owed £3,300 million, and which would have produced another big sterling crisis: a big influx of foreign capital into the Commonwealth.

But this foreign capital can easily be drawn out again.

Sir Oswald Mosley, in a speech at Birmingham Town Hall on 12.10.58 pointed to this strong possibility. He pointed also to the speech of Mr. Harold Wilson, Labour Chancellor-designate, at the Labour Party Conference, who claimed that Lord Hailsham would tip off foreign financiers to break the £ if Labour came to power, and to Lord Hailsham's reply, that of course there would be a financial panic if foreign speculators did not like a Labour Government's measures.

As Sir Oswald remarked, what greater proof existed that both parties had reduced Britain to the level of a helpless dependency? The size of the deficit of the overseas Sterling Area as the result of "over-production," the size of Britain's indebtedness to the Commonwealth countries on whose backs she has lived since the war, illustrate how serious is this country's position; it is kept going at the moment by a big influx of foreign capital.

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The "internal contradictions" of the old system are in operation more seriously than before, as Marx asserted they would be. Britain is in a position more serious than before; the Americans and Europeans can defend themselves to some extent, but Britain's utter dependence on world-wide trade leaves her wide open to every repercussion in that world-wide system, whether the product of the system's own decay or of the new tactics now being pursued by her Communist enemies to hasten its collapse.

Russia is being perfectly frank about her intentions. Mr. Khrushchev on several occasions has said that they stand for "peaceful competition," that they would show the capitalists how to compete, that Russia would "bury the West." Now Professor Varga, one of the Kremlin's leading economic experts, has published an article on the "Overproduction Crisis" of the West in

the June issue of *The Communist*.

Varga points to the self-evident facts. He uses the Marxian exposition of the old system's slump-boom-slump sequence, and states that the recent boom carried the seeds of the slump by creating "too much" productive capacity (as it has). He explains the extraordinary length of the 20-year boom by the second world war and Korea (Sir Oswald Mosley has frequently asserted that one world war and two rearmament booms have merely postponed the collapse of the old system to which he pointed in his *Greater Britain* of 1932).

But Professor Varga is not there to defend the West. He gloats over the fact that a torrent of goods is pouring out of Western factories for which there is no adequate market: he asserts that this is just the beginning of a world depression which will be longer and deeper than any preceding crisis. After that, he believes, will come communism.

Good Marxists believe that the old system will collapse because of its own rottenness, and thus bring communism. But the new rulers of Russia are going one better than Marx and are introducing new tactics to hasten along the process. Mosley warned they were on the way when he said in a May Day speech in East London in 1956 that:

> "The collapse of nineteenth century capitalism would come quicker and be made worse because of the new Russian plan to dump against us the products of their slave labour on the markets of the world at prices we could not touch."

On several occasions since he has explained that the Russians would select the markets they intended to break; they would simply enquire what was the lowest Western price, then undercut it by 10%; they could mobilise great production for dumping on any world market by simply depriving their own people of that production under their long-established methods of terror.

Their recent breaking of the price of tin was an example of the methods they are adopting increasingly. In past months they have unloaded more and more metal on the market. When pressed to join the International Tin Council they have politely declined the invitation, and gone on dumping. At last British Government acted, very late in the day as usual; at the end of August it reduced the quarterly importation of Russian tin from 2,090 to

750 tons. But by this time so much Russian tin had been put in the "pipeline" that a crash occurred on September 19 and the price fell £90 in that one day.

Russian tin dumping has badly hit Malaya. By the middle of September 30% of her miners were out of work and 37% of her mines were closed down.

Industrial leaders in Malaya are outspoken on this issue. Mr. K. J. Cummings, president of the Malayan Chamber of Mines, said "It should be clear to everyone that Russia is dumping tin on world markets to wreck the Agreement" (*Financial Times* 20.9.58).

Sir Douglas Waring, another leading producer, attacked Russia's "policy of economic warfare designed to cause hardship to primary producing countries, particularly under-developed areas" (*Financial Times* 16.8.58).

Dr. Ismail, Malayan Minister Without Portfolio, accused Russia of "wrecking the international tin agreement by consistent dumping" while in New York on 26.9.58.

Mr. Douglas Dillon, American Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, said in Geneva on 16.10.58 that "The dumping of tin by the Soviet Union has served to disrupt the economy of Bolivia and to deal severe blows to the hopes of the peoples of Malaya and Indonesia for an improvement in their economic well-being. As long as the Soviet Union and Communist China persist in these destructive practices, the hope for a better life for millions of people in the less developed countries of the world will become even more difficult of realisation."

Meanwhile, on 23.9.58, the Bolivian Foreign Minister said in Washington that Russian tin dumping was only "the first serious assault on Western metal markets." He continued:

> "They are deliberate political moves in a Russian test of the vulnerability of these markets. If they succeed in wrecking our tin market, the Russians can choose their next target, and I am certain that other metal-producing countries will find themselves up against the same situation we now face."

They look like doing so indeed. Mr. Turton, M.P., warned in Parliament on 21.7.58 that:

> "The policy of Mr. Khrushchev in developing the steppes could break the wheat market of the world. By their exports of aluminium they had broken the price of aluminium, and by their exports of Polish coal they had robbed the National Coal Board of markets."

Regarding wheat, *The Times* of 6.9.58 discussed Russia's big harvest this year, and said:

> "Even if Russian exports to East Europe are somewhat increased, and even if most of the surplus is put to reserve, as apparently happened to the surplus in 1956, the Soviet Government might still without great difficulty turn some additional two million tons into the world market, and undercut Canadian and United States wheat prices with serious effects on the Western economy."

(It should be remembered that Russia has done this before. In 1932/33, the period of the "liquidation of the kulaks," grain was forcibly collected from the peasants of the Ukraine, who died in millions. Their grain was then unloaded on world markets at almost give-away prices. This is the classic example of depriving the Russian people of their own production in order to dump abroad, to which Sir Oswald Mosley has repeatedly pointed. Comrade Serov would do today what Russian police chiefs have done in the past).

Oil is another commodity which the Soviets are selling at below-Western prices. It has been reported already that they are offering it at 6d. a gallon below British prices. Meanwhile *The Observer* of 17.8.58 reported that the Soviets are exploiting "the richest oilfields in the world between the Volga and the Urals" which may shortly enable them to export 100 million tons a year. They have also brought into use a new turbo-drill which American experts agree is ten times faster than anything like it in the West. All this, says *The Observer*, adds up to "an oil tycoons' nightmare."

The threat of Russian dumping of one commodity after another is generally a nightmare to a world already facing serious dangers of "over-production." If, as the Bolivian Foreign Minister fears, deliberate Soviet tactics to crash tin prices are merely a foretaste of what they are going to do in other metals, wheat and oil, the entire system of world-wide trade on which the old system rests is about to be undermined.

The country to be wrecked first in a sea of "too many goods" will be Britain.

Mr. Paul Bareau, writing in the *News Chronicle* of 19.9.58, said the Soviets were unloading commodities they stockpiled during the Korean War. They were stored for possible use in a military war, now they are being used up in a trade war. A safer war for the Soviets. A trade war as waged by Russia means the unloading of Soviet surpluses on to the open markets of the West while reprisals could be stopped by the closed system of the Soviets. It is strictly a one-way war; it might be called a massacre.

Professor Varga can predict with safety an "over-production crisis" for the West. The old Marxian "internal contradictions" are at work, with some new ones added to them by the neo-Marxists of the Kremlin. Britain and the other major industrial powers confront collapse, in a series of worsening crises, in which communism hopes to take the West over from within by its well-tried methods of insurrection and revolt backed by the unemployed millions of the big cities for whom there will be no markets.

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Can the West defend itself; or is it to go down in a flood of dumped production while it appeals to the Russians to "play the game"?

Mr. Roy Harrod has an article in the September issue of *Optima* in which he advocates a rise in the price of gold. He considers that the value of world gold stocks has not been raised in line with the enhanced dollar value of world trade since the war, and suggests that if this were done, the international system of trade could soon be put right again.

Mr. Harrod has some hard things to say about the "inertia" of the present monetary authorities: "one has to produce some head of steam to get an old-fashioned thing changed." The monetary authorities made two main points in reply. Firstly, they claim, an increase in the price of gold would launch a new wave of inflation (the principal fear of the Americans). A sudden injection of so much more money into the chaotic world system would bring havoc. In effect they say, one might as well get a rogue elephant drunk.

The second big American objection is that doubling the price

to equate them.

What is needed is machinery under the general direction of of gold would hand a formidable new economic weapon to Russia. Russia is a big gold producer. Mr. Oscar Hobson, writing in the *News Chronicle* of 20.2.58, quoted the London gold bullion brokers Samuel Montagu as saying that Soviet Russia now rivals South Africa as the world's largest producer of gold.

The argument is that to double the price of gold would increase Russia's ability to sabotage world trade just as much as it would give world trade a shot in the arm. Any advantage to the West would be cancelled out by the use the Russians put it to. "Half the world's gold is 'Red'", said Hobson.

Yet Harrod is saying what Varga is saying: he is saying it another way. Both agree that the value of goods in circulation throughout the free world far outstrips the world's ability to consume them. But Mr. Harrod, in seeking to correct this, would be producing inflationary chaos on the one hand, and on the other putting Russia in a stronger position to undercut.

There are two clear conclusions: to deal with over-production we must tackle the problem in an area closed to Russian interference (experiments are generally conducted in laboratories closed to inclement weather), and it must be an area under control of government able to use machinery that will overcome inflation (scientists always demand they should have full control of their equipment).

We must work in areas smaller than the length and breadth of the entire globe, particularly when a world storm is brewing. Sir Oswald Mosley has long suggested that our area should be Europe-Africa, to which British Dominions and parts of Latin America might adhere. Europe-Africa would be insulated against dumping from Russia or America. It would also, under government leadership, set up the economic machinery to raise popular purchasing power sufficiently to absorb "over-production" without causing inflation.

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"Over-production" is a misnomer. In real terms it is simply under-consumption, a lack of adequate popular purchasing power that means the lack of markets. The problem has arisen because markets no longer keep pace with output. The question is simply

government to create those markets scientifically.

Since the Empire system is no longer attainable, and the effect of the last world war has been to weaken Britain to such an extent that she was no longer able to hold the Empire together, Mosley therefore proposes that a scientific market system be built up in the only alternative area: Europe-Africa. At the same time he envisages machinery far advanced on his pre-war suggestions.

The Wage-Price Mechanism* would have immediate effect on today's recession, which is largely due to the decline in raw material prices. Monopoly or near-monopoly conditions exist in the primary industries producing raw materials within Europe-Africa: Mosley's policy would be to raise prices deliberately for all such commodities, and with them the wages of the workers in the primary industries. At once this would arrest the present commodity slump which plays so large a part in the general decline. It would also greatly benefit the British people and other peoples within the new Europe who trade with primary-producing countries. It would stimulate a large demand for the manufactured goods of the European industrial countries, which must become the backbone of the new system.

Raise commodity prices when there are gluts of commodities? —surely this is against all accepted economic theory? It may violate the principles of the old-time liberalism, which has succeeded in producing slump after slump; today new factors make it common sense. The answer is that commodities will not be produced in excess of the effective demand of expanded European industries producing for the larger market of a high wage system. Commodities will only be able to be produced at a price which gives their producers a proper wage which in turn will increase the market. Commodities will undoubtedly cost more in the early stage of the production cycle, but this higher cost will be met by modern mass-production in which the finished article will cost less even with high raw material prices (as the Americans have demonstrated for a considerable number of years). Even high wages cease to be the dominating factor; market demand is the key to the question, and the market will be created by the deliberate raising of wages throughout, not only in manufacturing industries but also in primary production in the Europe-African area. The Wage-Price Mechanism would also pay a higher reward, both

* The Wage-Price Mechanism is described in detail in *Europe: Faith and Plan* by Sir Oswald Mosley.

relatively and absolutely, to all pioneers in Africa and all agriculturists; in addition the basic services in Europe, like the defence forces and civil service, will equally benefit. The aim is the deliberate creation of wide demand among the 300 million Europeans within the area.

Create this demand in the form of popular purchasing power through high wages, and the gluts of manufactured goods also will disappear. High demand will encourage the installation of new and more efficient automation equipment; goods will be turned out cheaply even with high-priced raw materials and with high wages. As more goods roll out the Wage-Price Mechanism must anticipate this output and raise wages to meet it. (Such an investment boom will be worth while, because government will create the markets to justify the investment).

Mosley's system will work for certain clear reasons. It will be under the leadership of European Government with full authority over the entire area affected. Europe-Africa contains all the industries and raw materials needed for a full life. It will also be closed against the disruptive effects of dumping either by the Soviets or by America, and against the undercutting on world markets of cheap labour competition. It will be carried through without inflation, which will be countered constantly by equating production with purchasing power.

Through European Government leadership, the old "internal contradictions" within Europe-Africa can finally be laid to rest and the new wrecking tactics of the new Marxists will be kept out. Firm government using scientific machinery to match expanding production with expanding wages is the modern answer to the century-old Marxian analysis and to the myth of the Marxian remedy.

It can be done without leaning on the Americans. In fact it will be designed to take Europe off the American taxpayer's back. Then a renewed Europe can stand in friendship beside America against the world communist menace. The new health of the present invalid may even inspire the Americans to copy the prescription which wrought the cure—for America's own "internal contradictions."

FRANCE'S NEW ECONOMIC VITALITY

by BERTRAM PEEL

THE idea of France possessing economic vitality is one that older-thinking people in this country would not seriously have considered until recently. Even now they probably continue to regard France as the poor relation among Western industrial countries. If suddenly, tomorrow, the French balance of payments was to be plunged into the worst *crise* ever known, how many would knowingly say that they expected it all along, and with complete illogic add that France could in any case never again be strong.

The existence of a neighbouring country having financial and fiscal problems similar to the United Kingdom's is a great consolation to such people, providing an "excuse" for stoically bearing our own economic problems on the grounds that these things will happen, and can only be dealt with as and when they occur. The fact that two of Europe's largest nations are "both in the same boat" is some recompense for the fact that the third large nation is doing wonderfully well for herself thirteen years after her defeat. It also discourages fundamental questions, and limits our field of vision to Keynesian makeshifts designed to see us through to the next smooth patch.

To the extent that both our countries experience the fluctuations of world trade and finance, our problems are indeed similar. But whereas Great Britain is dependent on favourable conditions for her existence as a country of full employment, France is not so placed. This is why in less favourable times, such as we are now entering, Britain can maintain confidence in the pound only by closing down factories and laying off workers, whilst France can achieve the same confidence at no such expense. Britain's share of world trade, her visible exports, her production and employment are all declining, while France experiences continuing progress.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between these two "capitalist" nations? The answer may be found in the following comparisons. The value of United States exports of manufactured goods is currently around $5,000m., U.K. $3,700m., German $3,685m. but French only $1,745m. In terms of manufactured exports the U.S. takes some 25 percent of world trade, the U.K. 18 percent, Germany 18 percent and France only 8 percent—little more than Belgium and Luxembourg taken together, or Japan (1). In other words, France is far less dependent on world trade than is Great Britain; only 10 percent of the French national product is exported (4 percent to the French Zone and Saar, 6 percent elsewhere), while 30 percent of the U.K. national product is exported (10 percent to the Commonwealth, 20 percent elsewhere). (2).

Crudely therefore, Britain depends on world trade to the extent of 30 percent and France to the extent of 10 percent. This does not make Britain a Strong Commercial Nation and France a Weak Commercial Nation. It merely means that Britain is 70 percent independent and France 90 percent independent. France is therefore strong and stable while Britain is weak and unstable.

Very clever, says the Anglo-Saxon, but their standard of living is much lower than ours. This belief, common to a good 99 percent. of our population, is their one consolation now that America has far outstripped them in material luxury; there is always the notion that they still live better than the French. This happens to be entirely untrue, however. In the France of 1958 will be found fewer television sets, washing machines, electric dishwashers and similar devices; but the people eat better food and more, have wine regularly with it, are better clothed and better heated; one out of every ten persons (of the whole population) has a private car which they usually own and which is almost certainly under five years old; whilst there is one car for every twelve persons in Britain, a high proportion of them bought on credit, and at least a quarter pre-war vehicles.

Another favourite illusion of the British is that their Welfare State is the finest in the world. A reading of a booklet in English, available from the Labour Attaché, French Embassy in London, entitled "Social Security in France," would quickly show this to be an erroneous belief. Medical benefits, and those for invalids and old age pensioners are comparable with the British. Maternity grants and benefits are far greater and are varied to encourage couples to have children early. The family allowances are enor-

mous and begin with the first child; a family of three children would bring in the equivalent of £10 a month in certain regions; to this must also be added allowances for mothers not working and rent allowances, add also factory insurance and family travel at one quarter rate. The scheme for unemployment benefits is at present being re-organised and no details are available yet.

Yes, says the Anglo-Saxon, but there is still a vast proportion of poor peasants in France. There will always, in any country, be a thick slice of the populace in the lower income category; they can be found in France, and they can also be found in their millions in South East London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and many places besides; it is questionable whether these people "live better" or are "not so poor" as the French peasant. On the contrary, life in France today is good, for everybody. Remarkable is the fact that of a population of 45 millions, only one half is classed as "active," the rest being children or retired (3).

Having challenged certain well-known ideas concerning France, it is perhaps useful to examine significant aspects of her new vitality. Firstly, France produces by far the best part of her own food, and could produce all she needs without much effort; little more need be said on this subject except to advise the sceptic to avoid the tourist restaurants for once, mix with the people, and discover that the French live even better at home than they do in the restaurants. A year ago, for example, the Government was obliged to plead with the public to eat fewer steaks as the breeders could not produce animals with rumps and backs only.

Every year American businessmen come in appreciable numbers to Europe, and most of them visit France. The following are some recent comments:

> "It is time the citizens of the United States quit discounting France. That country is now a strong factor in the Western alliance and is strengthening her economic sinews by the hour"—N. White, Business Editor, *Christian Science Monitor*.
>
> "France is a rich, beautiful country and its people live and eat well. Its engineers are equal to engineers anywhere and several of the large factories I saw are as efficient as any in the States."—Henry Armstrong, President, University Engineering Co.
>
> "French fashions, furnishings and technical developments, for instance the Caravelle jet liner and the Alouette heli-

copter, have made a deep impression in America. We can learn much from French industry."—F. H. Mueller, Assist. Sec. of Commerce for Domestic Affairs.

"I saw many fine products with an excellent chance of sales in the U.S., for instance toys, textiles and various industrial items like small motors. I was also surprised to see how prosperous the French farmer (i.e. peasant) seems to be."—R. G. Lurie, Editor, *American Exporter*.

"There is being created in the heart of ancient Europe and France a new economy and productivity which will no doubt make a major contribution to the success and prosperity of the people of that continent."—V. Horsch, Assist. Sec., National Association of Manufacturers (4).

It may be surprising to learn (5) that more than half the chiefs of France's largest companies have had training in science or engineering. Forty-eight come from the famous Ecole Polytechnic. This high proportion of leaders with technical and scientific education has meant that French industries in general concentrate on improving techniques and developing new products, while market research, selling and public relations go comparatively unheeded. On the other hand French skill often leads the world, and we are told (6) of 70 ways in which, in the engineering field, the country's achievements have been ahead of any other nation. Another result is that French industry has frequently developed new products made under licence throughout the world.

The comments of Americans quoted in a previous paragraph are in sharp contrast with the remarks made by U.S. businessmen visiting Britain. Their comments to us are too often: "Why don't you . . . ?" The technological emphasis in French management is particularly appropriate in this age, but Britain is notorious for its "supervisory" style of management priding itself on skill in managing people rather than knowing the business; only now are dynamic men like A.E.I.'s Lord Chandos beginning to clear out the old wood in the bought-up companies, placing where necessary technically-minded men at the head of his divisions.

Our neighbours across the Channel are well ahead of us in this respect. Perhaps that is why the French national product has grown 100 percent since pre-war while Britain's has increased only 70 percent (7). The difference between French and British progress over the last five years is particularly marked; France has been progressing at nearly three times the rate of the United King-

dom (8). Put in another way, the French standard of living has been increasing at a rate of 4.5 percent per annum (surpassed only by Germany's 8.4 percent), the Italian rate being also 4.5 percent, U.S. 3.8 percent, Belgian 2.5 percent and Britain 1.1 percent (9). It is not to be expected that the rate of 4.5 percent can be kept up in France much longer, and a rate of 3 to 4 percent increase per annum is thought likely between now and 1961, a period during which the national product is considered likely to grow 15 percent (10).

Reference has been made to France's new technological achievements. To mention a few, there are the rail speed, endurance and mileage records; the longest cable railway span; the most powerful wind-driven generator, the first tidal power station and the smallest radio; driverless express trains and shunting; the first vertical take-off flight; the breaking of five helicopter records in one day; the highest dam, largest aircraft hangar, first electronic telescope; the most advanced mining machinery, the fastest turbo-drilling techniques. There are many more examples within specialised fields of engineering, but enough have been given to show that France makes a full contribution to twentieth century progress.

It is in the vital domain of energy resources that France is strikingly well placed to feed her industrial effort of the future. Forty percent of the country's energy needs are imported at present (11). This figure will rapidly fall in the immediate years to come. Coal is not a serious problem since all but a fifth of the country's requirements are met internally; as new forms of energy take over, the importing of coal will become unnecessary. As to electric power, France's needs are expected to double in ten years; this demand will be met by utilising hydro-electric resources, natural gas, tidal power, wind power and nuclear energy for driving the generators. The use of turbines actually placed in rivers now renders hydro power infinitely more flexible and useable; natural gas has been found in abundance in both France and the Sahara; the country is already Europe's largest uranium producer and is making enough to serve her 10 nuclear piles (12); wind and tidal power have immense possibilities owing to the size of the country's plateaux and the length of the coastline; as for oil, new discoveries in France itself are as nothing compared to the wealth of the Sahara, and a year ago M. Max Lejeune, then Minister for the Sahara, was claiming that by 1960 France would

be self-supporting in oil, although M. Ramonet, the new Minister of Industry, considers the country will still need to import half her oil in 1961 (13). As a point of interest, among other resources so far discovered in the Sahara are coal, iron, copper, manganese, tin, uranium and diamonds. France is about to become the wealthiest country in energy resources after Russia and the U.S.A., and it is possible she may one day prove at least as rich as either in energy forms.

France has grown prosperous and strong during the Fourth Republic. Despite parliamentary instability, she has shown enough spirit to give vitality to her industry, thoroughness to her civil service and public organisation.

Diverting for a moment into politics, it seems that, towards the end, the *Assemblée Nationale* became not to much a drag on the country as an irrelevance in the nation's affairs. It did not matter whether there was a Government or not. That is why so few protested at the end of the Fourth Republic.

In metropolitan France, the revolution which has so smoothly overtaken the country has given it the confidence it was never really allowed to feel under the old arrangement. A political revolution could never by itself make France great, but merely let its greatness emerge. In present times, when economic questions dominate, perhaps it is the task of Government to leave well alone except where leadership is clearly called for in particular circumstances.

In overseas France, the revolution puts an end to the indecision that was sabotaging the pioneer efforts of industry and science in the North African territories. Today there is a sense of the Franco-African community as there never has been before. This is no surface unity, either; France really does look after and use her overseas territories.

Thus, not only are France's fortunes in world trade and finance a matter of comparative irrelevance, as explained at the outset of this article, but political malaise or otherwise appears to make little difference either, which is another source of strength.

France is about to enter the Common Market, as it becomes active, with no lack of confidence. She is prepared to undertake what she is capable of as a step towards the union of Europe, but she will not undertake commitments which are beyond her. France has nothing to gain from free trade, but will benefit much —especially in the acquiring of capital—from a united Europe

linked to an African grouping. This is why France will be loyal to her partners in The Six but will not willingly open her part of the Continent to the doubtful prospects of free trade.

France is fully committed to the European Economic Community which has just completed its transitional year. The nation's industry is ready. One of the first tasks of the new Community will be to complete a network of oil and natural gas pipelines from the Sahara, through Spain or Marseille beyond France to Rotterdam and the Rhine. Parts of this scheme already exist. On such firm economic ground is the future of Europe being built.

Probably only now is British industry, and its workers, beginning to suspect that a dreadful mistake has been made by the powers-that-be in linking the country's future to diminishing world trade whilst achieving our exclusion from Europe and the expanse of Africa. Why should Europe be tricked into a free trade scheme deliberately intended as a temporary means of boosting up failing world trade? France will not allow herself to be deceived.

But how tragic it would be for Britain if, one day, Europe-Africa were to take the logical step and form its own independent and closed economic system based on the Franco-African experiment—with Britain outside. That is a prospect we should now consider very seriously.

(1) *Board of Trade Journal* 17.10.58.
(2) Actual goods appear to be exported to the tune of some 20%.
(3) *Jeune Patron*, April, 1957, p.31.
(4) Quoted in *Productions Françaises* No. 24.
(5) *France Actuelle*, October, 1957.
(6) Idem.
(7) *Hommes et Techniques*, July, 1958, p.708.
(8) Idem.
(9) *Le Monde* 24.8.58.
(10) *Le Monde* 20.2.58.
(11) *Revue du Commerce Franco-Britannique*, June, 1958, p.500.
(12) *The Times* 5.6.58.
(13) *Le Monde* 9.9.58.

STRASBOURG

by JEREMY MUNFORD

IN May 1959 the Council of Europe will be celebrating its tenth anniversary: the Statute of the Council was signed in London on 5th May, 1949. At that time it was believed that "throughout the ages philosophers, visionaries and statesmen have dreamed of a United Europe. Today this ideal has become a vivid and powerful reality." A statement issued on the day the Statute was signed by the Foreign Ministers of ten countries declared that:

> "The main feature of the Statute is the establishment of a Committee of Ministers and of a Consultative Assembly, which together will form the Council of Europe. Of these two bodies, the Committee of Ministers will provide for the development of co-operation between governments, while the Consultative Assembly will provide a means through which the aspirations of the European peoples may be formulated and expressed, the governments thus being kept continually in touch with European public opinion."

Yet in 1958 only the first steps were being taken towards an economic union of six of the countries represented in the Council; and the October 1958 session of the Consultative Assembly received, at least in the British press, little if any publicity. Can Strasbourg be written off, like Geneva, as a failure; or have the high hopes of ten years ago found any fulfilment in reality?

The Council of Europe has a number of achievements to its credit. The plan for the European Coal and Steel Community originated in the Council, when it was presented in the course of a statement to the Assembly by M. Robert Schuman. The Assembly followed and influenced the negotiations for the Community, and it was finally set up on 10th August, 1952. The Community pools the coal resources and steel resources of six member countries of the Council: France, Western Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.

The Council has also been responsible for a number of European Conventions. The European Convention on Human Rights was signed at Rome in November 1950: it lists the rights and freedoms which the democratic state should guarantee to its citizens, and since that time the European Commission of Human Rights and recently (October 1958) a European Court of Human Rights have been set up, which should provide the legal machinery to ensure respect of these rights. In the social field, the Council has been responsible for agreements on social security and medical assistance, which are the "first step towards conferring equality of rights and full entitlement to benefits in respect of social security and assistance to all persons living in the member countries." (1953). Conventions simplifying and standardising the procedure for making applications for patents of invention have been signed. (1953 and 1954). In 1957 agreements on the Movement of Persons between the member countries and on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes were signed.

In the cultural field, a convention was signed in 1953 making the diploma required for the admission to the university of one country (matriculation certificate, baccalauréat, etc.) valid for all member countries. A number of other schemes have been carried out, among them the series of European exhibitions of different periods, the latest of which was the Rococo exhibition in Munich in 1958. Next year an exhibition of the Romantic period is to be held in London.

The Council of Europe has also done good work in connexion with refugees and the problem of over-population: a Council Special Representative has been appointed for this question. Work in progress includes the simplifying of frontier formalities between the member countries, and a European Code of Social Security.

There is no doubt that the Council of Europe is a more useful organisation than the United Nations. All its members, with the possible exception of Turkey, are linked by common traditions of European culture. The fact that entry to the Council was only made open to countries with a democratic system on the Western model has also made for unity between its members. Discussion in the Consultative Assembly has been constructive, and it has not become, like the United Nations, the battleground of two hostile camps. The member countries of the Council are linked by common economic interests and similar social conditions. The aim of the Council, to bring about closer unity between European

countries, is a practical proposition, whereas the United Nations aim, of world unity, is not.

Unlike the United Nations, the Consultative Assembly includes representatives, not merely of the governments of member countries, but of other political parties and opinions in those countries as well: the United Kingdom delegation consists of nine Conservatives, eight members of the Labour Party, and one Liberal. Furthermore, the United Nations pattern of one country, one seat, whether the country concerned has a population of one million or two hundred million, is replaced by a system whereby the population of member countries is reflected in the number of seats allotted in the Assembly: thus the United Kingdom has 18 representatives, the Netherlands have 7, and Ireland 4. In contrast to the United Nations, admittance to the Council was given to Germany soon after its foundation, in 1950. Finally, an organisation which the Council of Europe helped to set up, the European Coal and Steel Community, also has considerable supra-national powers, in contrast to the organisations associated with the United Nations, whose decisions require unanimity by their members.

To all concerned with European Union, whatever their precise shade of political opinion may be, it must be encouraging that a European forum exists. At the tenth sessions of the Consultative Assembly, held in April and May 1958, the following questions were discussed: Council of Europe policy in the light of the present international situation, the problem of the Free Trade Area and the Common Market, the report of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, committee reports on the development of Africa, and the reports of other committees. There were speeches on the Free Trade Area by a number of ministers, among them Mr. Maudling, the Danish Minister for Economic Affairs, and by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. In addition to the debates of the Consultative Assembly, committees sit regularly on political, economic, agricultural, legal, social, and cultural questions. The committees meet in different European cities; thus in June, 1958, the legal committee met in the Hague, the political committee in Paris, and a committee on non-represented nations in Berlin. All these meetings contribute towards European understanding. The actual running of the Council secretariat, with a staff of about 300 on which the various nationalities are represented in numbers proportionate to the populations of member states, is in itself an

example of practical European collaboration.

It has been claimed that the Council of Europe is a possible basis for a European parliament. In character the Council of Europe is undoubtedly much nearer to an international parliament than is the United Nations: the Consultative Assembly, with its representatives of different political parties, corresponds roughly to a parliamentary assembly, and there is an "executive" in the shape of a committee of the foreign ministers of the member countries. But it was the existence of the Consultative Assembly which distinguished the Council from all the other international bodies previously established: for the first time, Members of Parliament were allotted an official role within an organization devoted to international collaboration.

It is clear that during the ten years of its existence, the Council of Europe has been doing good, if unspectacular work in the right direction. The ½d. which, it has been calculated, the citizen of Western Europe contributes annually, has been well spent. But is it enough? If progress continues at the present rate, will "Europe a Nation" become a reality in our lifetimes?

My first criticism of the Council of Europe is that it does not meet often enough to be able to accomplish much in the field of European unification, or even "to provide a means through which the aspirations of the European peoples may be formulated and expressed." The Assembly only meets twice a year—in the Spring and Autumn, and that for a period of only about a week. Obviously, within as short a period as this, it is impossible to give full and thorough discussion of European problems and up-to-date comment on current issues. The various committees and their sub-committees do, it is true, hold more frequent meetings, but these meetings receive even less publicity in the press than do those of the Consultative Assembly. The Council is quite obviously not fulfilling its function of "keeping the governments continually in touch with European public opinion." In the original recommendations on the organisation of the Council framed by the European movement, it was suggested that the Assembly should sit for a minimum of 45 days in the year, but according to the Statute the Assembly can meet for not more than a month in the year: it can meet as seldom as it likes. One difficulty is, of course, that the members of the Assembly are all busy members of parliament, with political activities in their own countries.

While members of the larger parties of the member countries, who already have their say in national parliaments, sit at Strasbourg, specifically European movements and parties are not represented. The representatives which each country shall send to Strasbourg are chosen by the national parliaments: as a result, only those "Europeans" can hope to get to Strasbourg who have chosen to work within the major political parties. The United Kingdom delegation includes Mr. John Hay (Conservative) and Mr. John Edwards (Labour); it does not include Sir Oswald Mosley or men from other countries who agree with him. This is the reason, of course, why the Council has been so cautious, and has taken only such small steps towards European unification during the ten years of its existence.

I have listed above, without comment, the main achievements of the Council, and readers can judge for themselves how much nearer the various Conventions concluded have brought European Union. The most concrete step towards European Union so far, the European Coal and Steel Community, originated in the Council; but it is interesting to note that the Common Market and Euratom, still very much in their early stages, did not in fact do so. In this field the Council of Europe was not even in the lead.

A further criticism of the Council of Europe relates to its composition. Despite its name, it represents only about half the peoples of Europe: of the 27 countries of Europe, only 15 are members. Obviously, the decision made in 1949 to exclude the countries of the Soviet bloc was the right one, if the Council was ever to reach agreement on steps towards European unity; I have already compared the Council in this respect to its advantage with the United Nations. But out of this decision, which was painful but necessary at the time, has grown a certain amount of feeling in favour of West European Union. Dr. Adenauer's views on this question are well known; but it is a pity that an Assembly, the framers of which suggested that a certain number of empty seats should be reserved for the unfree nations of Europe, has not in fact carried out this proposal, and has not been to the fore in attempts to secure Russian withdrawal from the countries of Eastern Europe.

The Council has let itself become too much identified with the Nato concept of "Western" unity. If no exception can be taken to the 1949 decision to exclude countries of the Soviet bloc from

the Council, it seems regrettable that room was found for Turkey, a doubtfully democratic and doubtfully European country, while Spain and Portugal, which have much deeper European roots, were excluded. A measure of unity among members was assured by the decision to admit only "democratic" countries, as was noted above; but would not a still greater measure have been assured if admittance had been made open to countries which, despite an unfashionable political set-up, undoubtedly share a European culture and history? Certainly, now that America has extended the hand of friendship to Spain and that Portugal is a member of Nato, consideration should be given to admitting these countries to the Council. (Switzerland, Portugal and Spain already participate in the work of certain of the committees of experts of the Council; but Israel, too, has sent observers to some meetings of the Council, and this is completely unjustifiable).

Other criticisms can be made of the Council of Europe. There is no doubt that the framers of the European Convention on Human Rights, mentioned above, were less concerned with fundamental and eternal rights than with trying to find agreement on the rights which citizens of the member countries already enjoyed. Thus, the original version of the Protocol to the Convention read that "the high contracting parties undertake . . . to hold free elections . . . under conditions which will ensure that the Government and legislature shall represent the opinion of the people." This was hastily altered when a United Kingdom representative pointed out that this might be construed as committing his Government to a system of proportional representation. It now reads "under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." Similarly, it was pointed out that Article 7 of the Convention, which guarantees protection against retroactivity of the law, would make the Nuremberg trials an infringement of the Convention; so a paragraph was added to Article 7 referring to "general principles of law recognised by civilised nations." This, like the amendment to the Protocol, makes the "Right" in question practically meaningless. On the question of human rights, as on that of admittance to the Council, eternal values were sacrificed to the expediencies of current politics. There can be no firm European Union on foundations as shifting as these.

But an even more fundamental criticism can be made of the Council. Does an Assembly, like the United Nations or the

Council of Europe, with no executive power of its own, represent the best approach to an international unity? So far, the only concrete steps towards an international union which have been achieved have been in limited and specified fields, e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community, and the Common Market. The agreement which has been gained through discussion in the Council has been on minor issues only. The Council has been left far behind whenever real steps towards European unity have been taken. There is now the spectacle of two European Assemblies sitting at Strasbourg: the Council of Europe, and the Assembly of the Six which in point of view of power and influence is far more important. This Assembly will soon be directing the economic policy of almost 200 million Europeans. The difference in the working importance of the two Assemblies can be gauged from the fact that whereas representatives in the Council of Europe Assembly sit in national groupings, the delegates to the Assembly of the Six spontaneously arranged themselves on its first meeting by political groupings, German and French Socialists and Belgian and Italian Conservatives sitting together. This gulf between the discussions of the Council of Europe, and the decisions which are all the time being taken and affect the daily lives of millions of Europeans, is likely to get bigger as the years go by. No doubt the Council satisfies the British Conservative with his vague concern for "European unity," but for those who recognise that the union of Europe may be a matter of life and death for millions of Europeans, and is a historical necessity of far-reaching importance, the Council of Europe is quite simply not enough.

I have tried to give above as fair a summary as possible of the achievements and uses of the Council of Europe, and have added my own criticisms and account of its limitations. During the years to come the Council is likely to debate and get some, at least, of its member countries to sign conventions and agreements on various aspects of European unification; it will provide a twice-yearly opportunity to debate European problems; and it will contribute towards better understanding between the peoples of Western Europe. But it is unlikely to take the lead in all the major schemes for European unification which the protagonists of the "Six" are now thinking of, nor is it likely to press Mr. Kruschev on his offer to withdraw Soviet troops from the countries of Eastern Europe if the Americans will withdraw theirs from the

countries of the West: an offer which, if genuine, could be the preliminary to a union not merely of six, not merely of fifteen countries, but of the whole of Europe. It will not stand for a policy of building a Eurafrican economy in an area large enough to contain its own raw materials and its own market, which can thus be insulated from the jungle laws of competition on world markets. In the case of a severe economic crisis in the West, which would make the building of Europe a Nation necessary in a few years, the Council of Europe is likely to be left completely behind, and might collapse altogether because of popular dissatisfaction in Europe about its too-leisurely pace.

To a large extent the Council has had to go so slowly and cautiously for the last ten years because it has had to make its pace conform to that of its slowest member, the United Kingdom. At the end of the war many Europeans hoped that Britain would use the moral prestige she had gained during the war to take the lead in unifying Europe. Such hopes were encouraged by the fact that Churchill was a President-of-Honour of the European Movement, and declared in a famous speech at Zürich that "we must build a kind of United States of Europe." Britain failed to give a lead, and was content with the slow progress made by the Council; she may still have the chance to do so, but the Briton will have to spend more than the ¾d. which he at present contributes towards European Union.

A Note on the French Constitution

by PHILIP de la VILLETHEART

SURPRISING for a country traditionally steeped in social and republican ideology that 80% of its community should have backed a referendum that clears the way to the constitution of the 5th Republic. It is the irony of fate and circumstance that ability and intelligence—for the French are blessed with a good measure of both—could be swiftly manoeuvred into a positive vote.

The new constitution is one that splits legislative power, concentrates authority in the hands of a selected few and bestows upon State Presidency extraordinary privilege and prerogative, to wit:—

The division of legislative power is set out in article 31 of the new Constitution, specifying matters that fall to the lot of Parliament. Article 31 must be interpreted in a negative sense, for all matters not listed therein will be dealt with by the Executive. The exclusion of property law, for instance, enables Government to legislate on industrial, commercial, corporate rights, requisitions, expropriations, public restrictive rights on land etc. . . . Social service law, education and labour, once the cherished bones of the House of Deputies, are for all practical purposes lifted from the deputies' kennel into the Government manger.

Acts of war and ratification of treaties still require parliamentary sanction. So does the budget—but only up to a point, as article 42, while recognizing Parliament's authority to read and approve the budget, sets a time limit to the reading, a month and

a half, after which Government shall promulgate it by ordinance.

But this is not all. The Government goes a step further. Article 34 contains a curious encroachment of Parliament's legislative powers enumerated in Article 31. Admittedly, it is a feature of the Chamber of Deputies to reach a deadlock over a particular issue though the clash of some fourteen political factions constantly at loggerheads with one another. Article 34 supplies a neat answer to this confusion: Parliament may be requested by Government to authorise the latter to legislate by way of ordinance on matters set out in Article 31.

The concentration of power in the hands of a few is the necessary consequence of Article 21, which forbids the function of parliamentary membership to be confined with Office. Henceforward, officers of state will be appointed by the Executive and rise from the ranks of the civil service. Bureaucracy, technocracy, may become the dominant feature of the new Republic.

The extraordinary prerogatives of the State President are threefold: He may dissolve Parliament with or *without* ministerial approval (article 10). He may remove from the Chamber of Deputies any question involving public policy and go straight to the electorate for a "oui" or a "non" by the device of a referendum; and finally he may in the event of crisis threatening the independance of France, its territorial unity or the execution of its international commitments, *take all measures dictated by circumstance* (article 14).

The word "crisis" could hardly have been more loosely defined and qualified. Over a decade France has failed in the execution of her trading commitments. Article 14 is clear in this that the President of the Republic may exercise all power and authority, enact law, suspend the Constitution and possibly declare war in circumstances vaguely related to emergency. If this is not a ladder to absolutism, then nothing is.

Will General de Gaulle's experiment save France, or ruin it? Time will tell. I am amused at the irony that willed that democratic France, on the 23rd September, gave a "oui" to de Gaulle to save the Republic. Only this and nothing else.

A DIARY

NAMING warships is a trickier business than naming race-horses. It was suggested, for example, that minesweepers should be called after various insects prefixed by a colour, but when the committee charged with making the choice was confronted with "H.M.S. Blue Bee" this particular idea had to be abandoned. I expect the committee's decision was rather wise. If a unit of the English fleet, eagerly awaited by its compatriots in the holiday resorts of the Mediterranean and Adriatic coasts, turned up with the name H.M.S. Blue Bee, it would never do. Much safer to call the ships after country villages instead, which it has now been decided to do.

In the late eighteenth century when the fourth Earl of Sandwich was First Lord of the Admiralty he chose the names of battleships all by himself; committees were not so well thought of in those days. But he did not escape criticism: people complained that he always called the ships after incestuous Greek gods.

I saw a television programme recently in which the inhabitants of new towns were questioned about the naming of streets. A councillor said they often gave them the names of mayors, but not until the latter "had passed on." I suppose it would make them too vain to have streets called after them while they were still alive. A number of men and women were then asked what they themselves would choose; the women liked picturesque and flowery names, but the men preferred them as plain as possible. One man thought Green Street and Brown Street would be ideal. But another said *street* was an old-fashioned word which should now be replaced by *avenue*. I suppose we shall have to get accustomed to hearing the opinions of "the man in the avenue."

★ ★ ★

Last month in my Diary I mentioned the brutal treatment accorded by stewards and delegates at the Conservative Party Conference to a few eccentric hecklers who interrupted Mr. Macmillan's speech to the faithful. The correspondence about

this incident in *The Times* was very fine. Lord Hailsham's letter was possibly the funniest, and it was certainly the longest—so long, indeed, that the printer had to resort to small type in order to fit it in. One letter from an Empire Loyalist was described to me by a Fleming fan as being "pure James Bond," with its hair-raising account of the torture inflicted on a heckler who had been rendered helpless by having his arms and legs tightly held.

Horrid though the behaviour of the audience undoubtedly was—a friend who watched it on his telly told me it was "revolting"—there is yet something irresistibly comic about the whole affair, and above all about Lord Hailsham's part in it. Blinded, no doubt, by television lights, and thus unable to see what was happening, he sat smiling fatuously throughout. After the storm had burst in the left-wing press (and the more honest among the right-wing newspapers as well) he wrote his letter to *The Times*, saying at inordinate length that (a) he had no evidence that what occurred had occurred, and (b) in any case it was what hecklers must expect. All of which (except of course the fatuity) comes rather strangely from the author of embarrassing little semi-religious verses about "the fragile bark that's me." (See *European No.* 51).

After the letters had dwindled in number and finally ceased altogether *The Times* pointed the moral in a report of a public meeting in Australia addressed by Mr. Menzies. The headline was: LESSON ON THE HANDLING OF HECKLERS. The implication was clear: it was a lesson for the Conservative Party. Wise Mr. Menzies, it appears, turned the heckling to which he was subjected to good account by arranging his microphone so that the meaningless noise made by the interrupters could be heard by wireless listeners throughout the country. His patience and the tiresome row of the hecklers made a nice contrast; by the time he was able to resume his speech he had won the sympathy of his audience, whether in the hall or by the hearth.

All this may seem a little bit unfair to Super-Mac. I daresay he could have dealt quite cleverly with his hecklers if he had been allowed to do so. But he could no more control the wild and over-excited delegates than he could prevent the television camera-men from rushing to film the scenes of disorder. Super-Mac was a helpless onlooker from the distant platform.

★ ★ ★

Has their Blackpool performance done the Conservatives any harm? Hard to say. I read some time ago that every time the government commits an act of aggression or near-aggression, gets tough somewhere, sends gunboats or paratroopers here or there, its popularity with the Tories takes a steep upward turn. It is possible that if, instead of Egypt, Cyprus or Iceland being menaced or attacked, the Conservative Government had moved to help the Hungarians against their giant oppressor (or the Poles, whose freedom they once solemnly guaranteed) it might not be so popular. Nobody, not even the most excitable Tories, wants war with a strong adversary (as they did for example, in 1914). They are extremely discreet in their valour.

It is the same in domestic politics, where they much prefer to bully a few cranks, any one of whom could be led quietly out by his beard, to braving the communist fighters of left-wing socialism. That is why they do not hold public meetings in red areas, but generally confine themselves to ticketed meetings of their own supporters.

★ ★ ★

On a raw November morning at Waterloo station a woman exclaimed in an indignant way to the world in general but also to me in particular because I happened to be near by:

"Look at that man! It's a shame! He's dressed in nothing but a blanket and his bedroom slippers!"

I looked. "I think he's a friar," I said. She calmed down a bit. "Oh, is that what they call it dear," she murmured doubtfully.

★ ★ ★

Driving in a Paris taxi at full speed, flying in and out of traffic, shooting the lights, cornering on one wheel, can be quite exciting. In London the taxis are usually more staid. The other day I was driven in one which beat all for thrills and close shaves. The taxi-man back-chatted in great good humour with angry drivers who were offended and startled by his cutting-in tactics. When at the end of a journey which was like *Lutzow's Wilde Jagd* I paid the fare he said: "Enjoyed yourself?"

D. M.

EDINBURGH INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL

PLAYS IRISH OR CATHOLIC

by EDWARD BOURKE-HALIBURTON

"The Bonefire" by Gerard McLarnon.
"Cuchulain" by W. B. Yeats.
"Bernadette" by Noel Woolf and Sheila Buckley.
"The Disciplines of War" by Willis Hall.

THE final impression left by the fumes of "The Bonefire" is that it is an anti-Catholic rather than an anti-Orange Order play. Jim Hanna is exceptionally weak-minded. He lets himself fall under the influence of a Protestant girl and commits suicide, thereby defying his religion on two points. The Orange men and women are at least positive in their political and moral attitudes. This may not have been the author's intention, but Tyrone Guthrie's admirably handled crowd scenes retain all the enthusiasm of the "Glorious Twelfth." Nor can I agree with Harold Hobson when, in *The Sunday Times*, he writes that he was shocked that the people of Belfast should allow such a "terrible portrait" (sic) of their city to be shown on an international stage. Has no one read "No Mean City"? Nothing highlighted in this play compares with what can go on in Glasgow every time Rangers play Celtic.

The one truly horrifying portrait is Vanessa Lindsey (Margaret D'Arcy), a psychological monster even in these days of emancipated gorgons. The words flung at her by Mrs. McComb, "English taught dirt" twist back the play to its proper perspective, and makes an opportunity for a finale Shaw could not have missed. The ground was well laid. Out of the tangle of unresolved characterisation, James Boyce's high-hatting and anglicised Lindsey was like a breath of fresh air. He is the tragi-comical butt from whom everyone takes their bearings and against whom they unfurl their true selves; his sole contribution to the last act is to escort Vanessa home after Hanna has thrown himself on the bonfire.

The trouble with Ireland is neither its Black Protestants nor its Papishers but those who come amongst us with notions that nothing in life matters except keeping up appearances and sensual gratification. If religious controversy scares off that type, and Gerard McLarnon's message seems to imply that it does, then the Battle of the Boyne could be refought to advantage, not once a year, but every day.

The Trinity College Players production of W. B. Yeats's play cycle of the Cuchulain saga drew better houses than expected to their wretched hall, thanks largely to the astute business management of Basil Petersen. I cannot pretend to admire or believe in Yeat's attempt to subjectivise the sagas and drape with orientalised shrouds borrowed from Mme. Blavatsky and the theosophists something intimately rooted in and nourishing the Western heroic tradition. The essential Irishness of the cast, which they cannot subdue, dissolves in romantic irony any serious attempt to portray a negationist Cuchulain bound to the Wheel of Rebirth. The Trinity players are like lusty boys trying to play girls in a school play, and would rather see Cuchulain cutting up the opposition than abstracting himself into Nirvana. They speak verse on the pulse of action as their ancestors spoke it, and not as the Middle English in a play by Mr. Eliot, and this again is against the author's intent. Nial McCarthy's Cuchulain, sultry and sure-footed, is too forceful for this anti-heroic mythos and Mr. McCarthy is right. It is worth remembering that Yeats never sought public performance of the plays, which he meant as philosophical studies in the idiom of poetry.

There are lines in one of the plays which epitomise the dream logic of the Irish people: "I care not whether I live a day or an hour so long as my deeds live after me." Everything Yeats wrote of the Son of Lug recedes from this point. "On Baile's Strand" is the earliest and the strongest of the five plays. Tacked onto the "Death" is a poem about the '16 which I seem to remember caused trouble in Dublin when recited on the public stage. It completely misses the point of the Rising and should be omitted. Louis Lenten is obviously happier playing old men, and his High King Conor enjoys great poise and dignity. Denis Tuohy's impersonation of the bard himself is a fine effort. Some day George Hodnett will make Kenneth Tynan eat his words about the poverty of Celtic musical tradition. He will not do this so long as his musical scores are used as cement for productions which would otherwise fall apart at the walls. A good composer deserves a good book.

"Bernadette" was commissioned by the Catholic Stage Guild for the Lourdes centenary. It's a play without beginning or end, only a middle—written primarily, it seems, to give Hugh Ross Williamson a spot as the Abbé Peyromale. Even so, much more could be made of his debate with the Mayor (Nicholas Tannar) who should represent the whole force of French rationalism and anti-clericism. In boxing parlance, the Mayor is a "set up" brought onto the stage to ensure that Holy Mother Church emerges victorious with the least possible trouble. Viola Lyel struggles with the truly appalling part of Mother Marie-Thérèse Vauzou, a mistress of novices whose cattiness passes credibility. I can find no historical justification for this vindictive portrait. In fact, the nuns were all for Bernadette and convents competed fiercely for her admission.

I confess these objections did not loom so large at the time but this was due to the sincere acting of the whole cast, especially Viola Keats, lovely as Mother Josephine Imbert.

The Oxford Theatre Group came with the great reputation made for themselves with Malraux's "Storm over Shanghai" and a new play specially commissioned from Willis Hall. "The Disciplines of War" is a group play written to provide each member of the cast with a significant part, and tailoring the part to the actor's personality. Mike Simpson, who plays the introspective sergeant, told me that they were all quite uncertain how the play would develop until they had rehearsed and found how each felt he would have acted in real life. A seven man patrol in the Malayan jungle during World War II is trying to get back to base. The "situation" around which each of the seven shows his true self is the decision whether or not to kill a prisoner. It is an experiment in improvisation, of character in search of an author, which Pirandello blew up to a triology. Pirandello believed that genuine improvisation, at any rate amongst Latins, was impossible as people are too much involved in their personal problems. This element obtrudes in "The Disciplines of War" but in another respect the play comes through with remarkable frankness. Most people picture themselves as heroes in an emergency, but the story blends with a spirit of humility which, I am sure, does less than justice to the true selves of the "Improvisors." Each member of the platoon bungles his job, waiting on the Japs to wipe them out. "Imagination makes cowards of us all . . ." Under real discipline, the seven could not act as badly as evidently they believe they would.

The play is full of military gaffes and anachronisms, which go to show that those connected with the production failed to perceive that war, as distinct from peace-time service, is not usually deplorable in its effects and that danger often brings out the best in precisely the more imaginative type. For example, the sergeant would have left his corporal in charge of the unit, not an inexperienced lance-corporal, and would not step out of the hut against the light. Stens were not in issue in 1942. The "Little men" who overran Burma and Malaya did not do so in steel helmets and trench boots but caps and slippers. British troops in the Far East were still in khaki; jungle green was not issued until 1946.

More disturbing to the play's central motivation is the attempt to transpose to an earlier period the military thought and jargon of 1958. The Fall of Singapore did not just change the colours on a wall map and alter a military situation: it closed an epoch. These criticisms do not affect one's mental participation in an interesting and possibly unique type of play.

It does not really matter whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army is called Tojo or Tamburlain and may be the sour grapes of the "you-never-knew-what-it-was-like" school, of militarised auks in the mid-thirties like ourselves who try to show

up the glitter of past glories by pouring syrup over the young men who have to do the job to-day. If Willis Hall should ever feel diffident about only knowing guerrilla warfare, he need not worry. It will be of more use to him than forming threes. As for anachronisms, he has Shakespeare for company.

I wonder whether it is intentional that the barrack room rebel should turn out the one good soldier, both acting decisively in an emergency and keeping protocol regarding treatment of prisoners. Patrick Garland as this rebellious Private Bamforth gives the best performance I can remember from an undergraduate. It is a mature, compact, fast-moving performance and he has a great flair for comedy.

CINEMA

Quiet Flows The Don, The Goddess, Cat And Mouse.

by VINCENT MURRAY

I HEAR that Eisentein's second part of **Ivan the Terrible**, still banned in the Soviet Union, has been shown abroad with great success. A complete copy of Douzhenko's remarkable **Earth** also appears to exist, and, one hopes, will find its way to this country.

The revival of these films makes one realise how much is lacking in even the best of contemporary Soviet production. **The Forty-First, The Cranes are Flying** are admired for their technical skill and for their revelation of more human feeling than has been evident in most recent Soviet films. But, important though these traits may be in the long run, at the moment they add up to just an exciting addition to run-of-the-mill commercial productions. The bewildering genius of an Eisenstein, the personal beauty of a Douzhenko no longer exist.

Most recent of the epic productions, meticulously put together without a hint of inspiration, is **Quiet Flows the Don,** adapted by Gerasimov from the long, crowded novel by Sholokhov. Even in its simplified form the story bulges with characters and incident. It takes in relationships between three families, two seductions, war-scenes from World War I, whippings and beatings and a final reconciliation. Grigori's father tries to marry him off to Natalia because the young man has been having an affair with a married woman, Aksinia. Grigori will have none of it, however, and runs off with Aksinia to work on Listnitski's estate. Natalia tries to commit suicide. When war comes Grigori has to leave Aksinia and baby, and under the strain of long separation, Aksinia allows

herself to be seduced by Listnitski's son Eugene. On his return Grigori beats both Eugene and Aksinia and goes off home to Natalia. The story is to be continued in the five further parts of this film. I don't think I am looking forward to meeting these people again, though the film itself has an attractive vitality. The war-scenes one expects to be good, and indeed they are, and the colour in exteriors is markedly subdued. Much of the film is inevitably episodic, a characteristic feature of Russian novel and film, and the whole is far from being the unity attained by Douskoi in his adaptations of the first two books of Gorki's autobiography. The material itself, conceived on a far grander scale, does not lend itself to the intimate style adopted by Douskoi, and a breathless urgency of narrative takes its place. As entertainment the surface action absorbs; only later reflection lets the doubts creep in.

Paddy Chazevsky is one of the newer names that have found their way to Hollywood via television. So far his name has appeared on the credits for Marty and The Bachelor Party, and now, almost simultaneously with the appearance of his latest film **The Goddess**, comes the publication in this country of a book of his Television Plays with comments from the author. The script for the new film does not appear in the book, for unlike his other scripts this one was written primarily for the screen, and when you have said that you have put your finger on why The Goddess does not tick over as it should. Chazevsky is in his element depicting the loneliness of ordinary people, at work or play, as the success of Marty and The Bachelor Party amply illustrates. The subject matter of The Goddess takes him out of this territory, though his starting-off point is the same.

This time he is not content to observe, he must comment by showing the results of loneliness on a child. The trouble lies not so much in his decision to enlarge upon his normal territory as in making a special case out of it. Emily Ann Faulkner had an unhappy and lonely childhood. She longs for success in Hollywood and, as a young woman, marries, disastrously, a soldier, John Tower. Divorced, she becomes a Hollywood starlet, marries, again unhappily, an ex-pug and finally becomes a star under the name of Rita Shawn. A nervous breakdown, an attack of "religion," drinking-bouts and drug-addiction enliven the rest of her career.

Kim Stanley is very good indeed once she has finished the childhood stage of her character, and the script gives her every chance to develop her part. In fact too many of the scenes build up to a purely local climax, having little to do with the general shape of the film. One becomes, indeed, sated with climax, and the overall impression is of relentless pressure without any relief whatsoever. Supporting parts are well played by Lloyd Bridges, Betty Lou Holland and Elizabeth Wilson. If only the events had been toned down a little their parts would have carried far more conviction, but even as it is Chazevsky's dialogue is apt enough

to impart at least a temporary effectiveness to individual scenes.

May I point out a very modest little British production, **Cat and Mouse,** which Paul Rotha has directed for Anvil Films. Rotha, a famous name in British documentaries, has indulged in feature-direction once before (No Resting Place), but not by any means as feature-mindedly as in this one. The story (of a girl kept prisoner in her house by an American on the scent of diamonds) comes from a novel by John Creasey. Its construction, retained in the film, is taut and extremely economical. Rotha and cameraman Wolfgang Suschitsky have made good use of the London scene, but all in all the importance of the film lies not in its story, but in the telling of it. It proves that second features need not have that airless, remote quality we have so readily come to expect. Often the training ground of young technicians, the second feature has here received the benefit of an experienced hand; I hope its influence will be felt.

NEW BOOKS

JACK KEROUAC'S "ON THE ROAD"

by JOHN PATRICK BURY

JACK KEROUAC'S *On the Road** has been hailed as the literary exemplar of a strange new manifestation in the American scene—the Beat Generation. The Beats are the delinquents and near-delinquents, the wild ones who "dig" noise speed and drink, the rebels without a cause, the refusers to conform who reduce sober citizens to despair. And outraged disgust, the disgust of an Establishment challenged. Why on earth, say the squares (much as their British counterparts throw up their hands when they read about rock 'n-roll riots) should the tranquil routine of America in this age of unparalleled prosperity and gracious living, where there are two cars in every port and even the unemployed drive down in their own cars to pick up their dole checks, be troubled by this upsurge of anarchism?

A moment's thought, of course, serves to show why the Beat Generation has risen, like a caveman at a cocktail party, to horrify the American Establishment: readers of Nietzsche in particular will appreciate that it is the very humdrum appalling smoothness of that way of life that has produced the upsurge. In particular in the old-established North-East—as I know from having been there, and where I note Kerouac was brought up (in Lowell, Massachusetts) is life a flatulent round of commuting, offices, grey-flannel suits, folksy conformity, golf, television-watching and the rest. At which point the Beat phenomenon becomes of significance to us.

Much recent American writing has exposed the savage neurosis which seethes beneath the glossy world of exurbia—Tennessee Williams' latest play *Suddenly Last Summer*, Grace Metalious in *Peyton Place* and the late John McPartland in *No Down Payment*. A new pessimism has arisen.

The Beat theme really arrived with Irving Shulman's *Children of the Dark**, world-famous in virtue of being the basis of the

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* Published in England by W.D.L. Books 2/6d.

James Dean movie *Rebel without a Cause*. Before coming to Kerouac, I should like to digress briefly to consider Shulman's presentation of this new American tragedy. Most people know the story from the film—the riotous teenagers in the small town, the ill-starred car-race to the cliff-edge to prove who "chicken" first, the fevered search for thrills and "kicks," the climax where the demented "Plato" Crawford barricades himself in his house with a shot-gun and defies the world in order, Shulman shows, to feel "free," no longer bound by some stupid ego that preached at him and wanted him to practise self-abnegation.

Shulman makes it abundantly clear that "Plato's" rebellion is that of a brilliant youth, dreaming incessantly but ineffectually of finding fuller, richer life, of being an archaeologist or an air-pilot, of finding a friend with whom he might "go places together, hikes, rides, trips, *maybe to Chicago for fun, even Europe.*" (In America, incidentally, I found young people everywhere chafing at "the same old round" and longing to go away to Europe, which is too them a far-off land of excitement, much as many young Europeans dream of running off to America for precisely the same reason. As Turgenev says: "Happiness is where I am not.")

The *Children of the Dark* is an impelling tragedy. It is basically pessimistic, an indictment of the bourgeois who drive flaming youth to disaster, and of a piece with other pessimistic writings of the Williams-Metalious-Cozzens type. The rebels are crushed, and the novel stops short with understanding and compassion—very commendable virtues, but, one feels, rather ineffectual to the satisfying of the aspirations of real gone cats out for flips and kicks. Which is where Kerouac comes in—he is with the cats, urging them on, as a portent of a brighter, freer way of life.

Kerouac praises, gives justification to the wild ones: much as in previous epochs there was Nietzsche to say Yea to the stark world of Schopenhauer, and as the sun also rose on the Twenties' waste land.

"Plato" Crawford's tragedy was that he wanted to "go places" but never did. Kerouac's, however, is a tale of action achieved: his characters go somewhere, for they go "on the road," across the length and breadth of the exuberant land which is all around.

Briefly, the story of **On the Road** is of four expeditions under-

taken by Sal Paradise, the narrator, across the North American continent. In the first Sal leaves home in a New York suburb and thumbs lifts to see friends in Denver and San Francisco, and then returns. In the second he goes again to San Francisco, this time with Dean Moriarty, the Beat Paraclete, and one of Dean's wives, in a hot-rod, via Louisiana, Texas and the South-Western desert. In the third trek, Sal and Dean drive a car for a travel bureau from Denver to New York, and in the fourth, they go from Denver to Mexico City.

These odysseys are described with verve and enthusiasm. Kerouac has a rushing Whitmanesque flow of language which transmits his own delight to the reader. His cars "zoom," his people "rush," his cities "gleam," and ever their destinations

> "Loom ahead like the Promised Land way out there beneath the stars, across the prairies of Iowa and the plains of Nebraska, and I could see the greater vision of San Francisco beyond like jewels in the night."

The mystique and mythus of the Beats is traced through the delineation of Dean Moriarty (doubly symbolic name?) Dean has been a reform-school boy, the son of a hobo, a piece of human flotsam, but withal "a youth tremendously excited with life." Dean was

> "Wrapped up in a fast car, a coast to reach and a woman at the end of the road. His 'criminality' was not something that sulked and sneered: it was a wild yea-saying outburst of Amercian joy: it was Western, the west wind, an ode from the Plains, something new, long-prophesied, long a-coming—he only stole cars for joy rides."

What is the meaning, the worth, if any, of all this frenzied activity? There is an obvious connexion with existentialist literature in this pure experience the beat-men exalt—Kerouac uses some existentialist terminology: going "on the road" is a "down-going," whereas stopping in New York produces "nausea": Dean has a curious habit of prodding and stroking himself and exclaiming "Am" or "Yes."

On the Road is devoid of exhortation and is sparing of introspective sequences leading to the formulation of a rationale. Sal notes, however, that for Dean "sex was the one and only holy and important thing in life": later he reflects "on a kind of holy lightning I saw flashing from his excitement and his visions." That word "holy" gives a clue: we find this same word used repeatedly in Nietzsche, for example when Zarathustra declares:

> "All days shall be holy to me—thus spake once the wisdom of my youth, verily the speech of a joyous wisdom." (The Grave Song, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*).

Dean comes unconsciously to a philosophy in line with the intuitionist metaphysicians, who see in the pure delight one feels from intense experiences—movement, action, speed, sex, intoxication, nature and "God's beautiful world," a truth of its own; in a world where reason produces shifting and clashing certitudes, a knowledge brought to us in radiant power.

The aforementioned enthusiasm with which Kerouac transmits the feel of people, places and experiences is the vehicle of this holiness. The words he chooses, by their evocative power, show every experience as vivid and worthwhile; and by that alchemy of language, make them meaningful for us. In the Rockies Sal and his friends "fumed and screamed in our mountain nook, mad drunken Americans in the mighty land." From the mountains, California lies "green and wondrous from our aerial shelf." They reach "the fabulous white city of San Francisco on her eleven mystic hills . . . all smoke and goldenness in the late afternoon of time." In Texas the moon "fattened, she grew huge and rusty, she mellowed and rolled till the morning star contended and dews began to blow in our windows, and still we rolled." This is how pagans, Romantics, nature mystics, see the world.

Dean's earthy philosophy of the here and now is at one point identified by Sal with Taoism. Perhaps there is some connexion with this concluding injunction of the Tao Te King:

> "Make the people's food sweet, their clothes beautiful, their houses attractive, their daily life a source of pleasure."

On the other hand it is most certainly not in accord with the words that immediately follow:

> "Then the people will look at the country over the border, will hear the cocks crowing and the dogs barking there, but right down to the day of their death they will not trouble to go there and see what it is like."

It occurs to me that Dean's mysticism does indeed tend in the direction of the simple sensuous joys of the first of these quotations, and by contrast with the covetousness of so much in the way of life of the squares, could bring him in the direction of the calm contentment implied in the second: except that, having renounced the bourgeois round and the excess of possessions it leads to, he does not go in the direction of Chinese stay-at-home quietism, but prefers to go forth, delivered, to what our Western

thinkers call true realities, viz. music, friends, and travelling the earth. A synthesis of the Oriental sages' renunciation of trivialia and television, without the vegetativeness, with the dynamic activity of the Westerners, without the rapacity—what a philosophy that would be! Indeed, a religion, which, we are told, the whole generation seeks . . .

Towards the end of the book, when Sal and Dean drive down to Mexico, this mystique becomes pronounced. Dean digs the folk of that drowsy land because "the old men are so cool and grand and not bothered by anything. There's no suspicion, nothing like that." Of course, by now, having ditched three wives and several jobs and rushed all over the continent looking for women and his hobo father and people to talk to about Nietzsche, Dean has alienated most of his friends. One rounds on him with the accents of orthodoxy. "You have absolutely no regard for anybody but yourself and your damned kicks . . ." (it is a woman talking, naturally) Dean grins, and Sal dubs him the Holy Goof. Before the apostrophe Dean stands:

> "His bony face covered with sweat and throbbing veins saying Yes, yes, yes, as though tremendous revelations were pouring into him all the time now, and I am convinced they were, and the others suspected as much and were frightened. He was BEAT, the root, the soul of Beatific."

And so Dean and Sal go, in a fever of Dionysiac excitement, to Mexico.

> "We had finally found the magic land at the end of the road and never dreamed the extent of the magic. 'Think of those cats staying up all hours of the night,' whispered Dean, 'And think of this big continent ahead of us with these enormous Sierra Madre mountains we saw in the movies and the jungles all the way down and a whole desert plateau as big as ours and reaching clear down to Guatemala and God knows where—whoo! What'll we do? What'll we do? Let's move.'"

Dean is the Holy Goof because he digs so joyously places, food, sex, flips, deserts, stars and people—all God's creation, to use Christian language. Yes, it is a religion.

For some reason incomprehensible to me the American Beats have been linked with the English Angry Young Men. True, they are against the same things—yet contrast Osborne with his seedy self-pitying entertainers and sweet-stall proprietors cowering in English suburbs complaining that they're not living, with Kerouac's vibrant knights of the road. In Osborne there is

rancour and defeatism: in Keruac there is exuberant zest for broad America; and for people, not anger, but understanding.

Kerouac seeks out people whom he can respect, like Dean Moriarty and Carlo Marx and Rollo Greb who "didn't give a damn about anything, a great scholar who goes reeling down the New York waterfront with original seventeenth century manuscripts under his arm, shouting," or Old Bull Lee, a sage they visit in the bayou country who had "seven different personalities, each growing worse on the way down," or the Okies with whom Sal picks cotton for a dollar-fifty a day in California, or the hundreds of hobos he sees on a freight-car "rolling merrily along with packs for pillows and funny papers before their noses and some munching good California grapes picked up by the siding."

In *On the Road* one learns that not all Americans are gracious living squares in grey-flannel suits, and one perhaps likes the Yanks the more for it. In Hollywood "that grand wild sound of bop floated from beer parlours, it mixed medleys with every kind of cowboy and boogie-woogie in the American night" . . . in the pallid circles of the arty-smarty young angries in London this kind of thing would no doubt be frightfully Lumpen-proletariat and so forth, but in Kerouac, the Beat mystique is seen as an exciting, free, and vigorous new way of living.

The nearest thing to a message in Kerouac is this discovery and re-affirmation of rag-tag humanity and their persistent capacity for catching what they can of life in its crude, raw forms—drinking, jazz, sex, movement, and restless roving up and down the free earth.—There are in *On the Road* echoes of Hemingway, Mark Twain and Whitman, and from further back, of Cervantes: Dean is a modern Quixote a-flame with wild visions, and Sal, the chronicler, rationaliser and bailer-out-of-trouble, is a Sancho Panza, also capable of being fired by the visions. There is no message in Cervantes either of course: but his truths are remembered when those of the squares are forgotten.

In Memorium New Statesman

By DENIS GOACHER

THE New Statesman truly believes
that trouble in the Middle East
has something to do with Mr. Macmillan.
Furthermore, an increase in crime of 13%
can be dealt with,
dear New Statesman reader,
" by way of educational influences,
" skilled parental upbringing
" and medical aid for the mentally sick."
As though
(and may God not forgive them the omission)
rock n' roll did not exist
as though
stereophonic crooning did not exist
as though filthy ash-strewn coffee bars
did not exist
as though shops devoted to MODERN BOOKS
omitted to offer mamillary nudes
on the fag-flecked altar of Onanism.
For you must realise,
dear New Statesman reader,
that you should anguish about negroes in S. Africa:
but never shout from Nelson's Column
that the degraded life in England's Black Country
is shame no deeds can obliterate.
Piccadilly Times Circus Square
is very jolly

dear New Statesman reader:
so are advertisements for sweets and brassières
in the snug old Underground.
And if boys go delinquent
(the foregoing, you realise,
has nothing to do with it)
there is always medical aid!
You must have heard, dear reader,
of electric shock treatment
and tranquillizing drugs.
Educational influences?
You can bring up your boy
to wish to God
he lived anywhere but in England.
Very nice to feel snobbish about your country's diet
and find comfort in the New Statesman Wine Supplement.
None of this, please believe me, is connected.
It's very hearty,
if you're thin, grey and fifty,
to applaud the breasts on the Daily Mirror's cover:
I mean: applaud their "honesty."
For you see, sweet New Statesman reader,
you don't realise
when you gasp about Indian rickets
that thousands of Midland cotton workers
are now out of a job:
that was stuff for the nineteen thirties
so of course it doesn't reach your paper:
Welfare's got 'em on relief
so that's quite O.K. ain't it,
dear reader.
And if you're still confused,
no need to hug a book from Kegan Paul:
Great Turnstile tells you deadly straight
"Unfortunately we know little
"about the effects of social factors."

O'NEILL'S ABSOLUTISM IN THE THEATRE

by EDWARD BOURKE-HALIBURTON

"Long Day's Journey into Night" by Eugene O'Neill.

A PLAY by Eugene O'Neill is so full of intuitive penetrations that it is impossible to criticise after seeing only one performance. All I can do is to record some tentative impressions.

O'Neill was not only the greatest playwright of his age. He was the only playwright who could be classed with the five or six greatest of all time. If we are to enquire as to which dramatist of the past 30 years the modern theatre owes its greatest debt, one would not mention O'Neill but Pirandello, therefore comparison between these two very different writers should be illuminating.

Pirandello has extraordinary inventiveness, sense of colour, subtlety for personality and situation, and the revolution he wrought in the theatre is due to his far-reaching experiments in the realm of inter-communication between the actor and the audience, the actor again and the author and producer, until the whole theatre is involved in the creation of the play in process on the stage.

O'Neill innovated nothing. His immense talent, instead of leading to fruitful derivation, soaked up the creative potential around him as can be seen from the barren state in which he left the American theatre and indeed the literary scene. Anyone attempting to live within his arc was dwarfed by him, not only by his unusually heightened perception and sustained powers of expression but by his enormous sense of theatre. The boys of the "beat generation" are his pallid heirs.

Theatrical flair, expressed through power drives and judgment for the great moment, is O'Neill's first gift from the gods. With craft secrets which a handful of our most perceptive playwrights and critics appreciate but which only he, it seems, knew how to supply, he could crack an audience like a nut. He knew that to shock is to absolve the sense of gilt; that laughter is closely allied

to dread; that people are hardened, not moved to pity, by the spectacle of disease upon the stage; that certain phrases repeated again and again produce a state of exasperation followed by intoxication whereas other phrases merely annoy; that playing time is the essence of drama; that violence must always be implied, never enacted.

O'Neill supposedly adapted archaic Grecian modes to the modern stage. He is supposed to have resuscitated the myths. But the archetypal tradition and "spirit of tragedy" had never deserted the European theatre with which O'Neill, through his Irish antecedents, was intimately connected. He stuck to lines laid down by Ibsen, fifty years ago.

The bare stage of classical drama was first noted by Racine as encouraging in actors freedom of gesture and in the audience maximum use of the imagination. This is precisely what O'Neill did not want. He chose deliberately fustian sets and rivetted his characters to chair legs and the symbolic whiskey bottle. He adhered to temporal and spatial unities with the rigour undreamt of by the classicists: the curtain drop denotes only the passage of time and one is shoved on from one act to the next without a moment's recapitulation. Pirandello sees the theatre as a fairy palace or a wizard's cave. O'Neill steps into the theatre like a lion-tamer into a cage.

From the principle that the narrowest stream makes the biggest flood, O'Neill shutters the visual orbit and pours language through the ears until the senses reel. Language he never uses only to convey information, but to inundate. When the understanding can take no more, the magic of poetry sets to work until the dividing wall separating the religious from the aesthetic experience is drawn apart. Pirandello is a psychical writer of extra-dimensional perceptions: no matter how many doors of consciousness he unlocks, he stays within the realm of the five senses. O'Neill—in the correct use of the much abused words—is a spiritual writer and a mystic.

I am very much drawn by certain observations made by Kenneth Tynan in *The Observer*. Quoting another critic of the twenties, Stark Young, Mr. Tynan writes: ". . . O'Neill's theatrical power did not arise from any strong dramatic expertness (sic) but . . . what moved us was the *cost to the dramatist of what he handled*." (My italics). With specific reference to the "Long Day's Journey," he goes on to say: ". . . What grips us about (the play) is not the

craft of the playwright. It is the need, the vital driving pliant of a human being."

This is a type of criticism incomprehensible to someone who, through sweat and tears, has tried to express the intensely personal in dramatic form. Experiences such as O'Neill underwent in his youth resemble, in the raw, ravings from a psychiatric ward; as it does in any creative writer of comparable spiritual stature. The cost to Shakespeare of "Timon" was certainly no less than "fear"—but only one is a perfected play. In one, the human craving was mastered by the mind and will of the craftsman, whereas in the other, it ran wild. Depths attained by O'Neill in human suffering would have been incapable of lucid interpretation on the stage but for extraordinary dramatic expertness.

"Long Day's Journey Into Night" is O'Neill's last play. Because of the fantastic shifts of pace it may be even a sterner test of acting ability than "Mourning becomes Electra." There are four main characters. The father, James Tyrone, is a former matinee idol gone over to "ham" and despising himself for it. Land-hungry and miserly, he is the first-generation product of the Irish famine and eviction policy of the 1840's. His eldest son, Jaimie, hates the heredity he believes responsible for the family's degeneracy, yet in his fierce filial piety and headstrong passions, is the most characteristically Irish of the four. (There is an article to be written on the correspondence of heredity and environment in O'Neill). The younger son, the consumptive Edmund, is the more resolute and clear-sighted: he fights to break the bonds which drag them down through self-expression as a writer. Mary Cavan Tyrone is the mother whose relapse to the morphine syringe is the dread under whose constant shadow the family survives. The play's enigma lies in the guilt motif: in the attempt by the family to fix ultimate responsibility. Not until the riddle is solved can the redemptory process begin.

In what must be the longest first act ever performed, O'Neill racks his audience with the ceaseless repetition of accusation, repudiation and repentance as the four members of the Tyrone family, like flies caught by the glare of the electric light, chase each other round the room. Verbal battery and expiation follows so fast that we scream to go home, as even home could not be as bad as this. In the second act, the whiskey comes out and, like rain blobs before a storm, we sense relief and deep foreboding.

At a point when the play's moment of truth might well have been lost in the clash of histrionics, Anthony Quayle as James Tyrone shows the depth of his technique as an actor. After more than two hours of humiliation as the father figure, with his wife now entering upon the final act of self-degradation, it might be expected that Mr. Quayle would seize victoriously upon the opportunity for justification now offered. Instead, with majestic self-abnegation, he withdraws back stage from whence he builds up Edmund for his great moment. This is half-way through the third act, when Edmund recalls the shining hour of his existence in the language of poetry so unearthly that when he has finished, a gasp is drawn from the house which sinks back, shimmering in the sweat of the catharsis.

It is a noble sacrifice for an actor to allow his big speech—a movingly worded apologia—to be topped almost immediately afterwards. After Edmund has finished, the stage clears for the other son to make his kill, but James Tyrone avoids the proffered bait of victimhood. Over all is heard Mary Cavan moving about upstairs, and the dreadful suspense of what she will be like when she returns mounts to the point of unbearability: "enter Ophelia, mad . . ." The conclusion which contains a confession of frustrated vocation, is so translucently beautiful that the heart aches and the eyes fill with tears at the remembrance of it.

Next Month In
THE EUROPEAN

Peter Whigham writes on Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*.
(Unavoidably held over from this month)

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